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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, we propose a novel cyberspace defense solution to the growing 
sophistication of threats facing networks within the Department of Defense.  Current 
network defense strategies, including traditional intrusion detection and firewall-based 
perimeter defenses, are ineffective against increasingly sophisticated social engineering 
attacks such as spear-phishing which exploit individuals with targeted information.  
These asymmetric attacks are able to bypass current network defense technologies 
allowing adversaries extended and often unrestricted access to portions of the enterprise.  
Network defense strategies are hampered by solutions favoring network-centric designs 
which disregard the security requirements of the specific data and information on the 
networks.  Our solution leverages specific technology characteristics from traditional 
network defense systems and real-time distributed systems using publish-subscribe 
broker patterns to form the foundation of a full-spectrum cyber operations capability.  
Building on this foundation, we present the addition of covert channel communications 
within the distributed systems framework to protect sensitive Command and Control and 
Battle Management messaging from adversary intercept and exploitation.  Through this 
combined approach, DoD and Service network defense professionals will be able to meet 
sophisticated cyberspace threats head-on while simultaneously protecting the data and 
information critical to warfighting Commands, Services and Agencies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
I used to think that cyberspace was fifty years away. What I thought was 
fifty years away, was only ten years away. And what I thought was ten 
years away... it was already here. I just wasn't aware of it yet.   
Bruce Sterling, 1993 [1] 
 
These words illustrate the dilemma facing technologists, engineers, scholars and 
even the military and are as relevant today as they were in 1993.  They highlight a 
fundamental misunderstanding, misperception and even miscalculation of what 
cyberspace is and how to operate within its limits.  But more importantly, they capture 
the daily struggle to understand how to defend cyberspace. 
This is just the beginning; the beginning of understanding that cyberspace 
has no limits, no boundaries.  
Nicholas Negroponte, 1999 [2] 
Affirmation from Mr. Negroponte came when he was speaking to an Internet 
group about the concept of time in cyberspace; a place with no borders and essentially no 
limits.  He spoke these words in 1999 and yet our evolved understanding and recognition 
of cyberspace in the macro view as a limitless domain of networks, never followed.  We 
continued to hobble down a path of monolithic network-centric solutions and strategies, 
funding network security versus cyberspace security, approaching network defense as a 
network problem versus an information problem.  
While ultimately solving “the problem of cyberspace defense” is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, we present a solution to defending our portion of cyberspace, not as a 
network, but as information which needs to be protected; information-centric versus 
network-centric defense. 
The purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to propose a structured, information-
centric, distributed network system employing covert channel publish-subscribe broker 
pattern communications to improve the protect-detect-react cycle of defending systems in 
cyberspace.   
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A. BACKGROUND 
This thesis is organized into three main chapters which focus on the underlying 
principles or objectives of the overall proposal; network defense, distributed systems, and 
covert channel communications.  Following the main body of the thesis, we devote a 
fourth chapter to a case study which highlights that this goal is realistic and attainable. 
1. The State of Cyberspace Defense 
Chapter II focuses on several complex issues that lay the foundation for a new 
approach to network security which is fraught with numerous challenges.  This chapter 
begins with a brief discussion of the history of network security and that while not a new 
subject, the numbers and types of threats are constantly changing, creating an extremely 
difficult environment to protect.  We then look at several examples of how attacks can be 
used by an adversary to gain control of a host or network and gather vital intelligence or 
steal data without detection. 
A solution is proposed at the end of this chapter and expanded in later chapters 
addressing the need for security professionals to rapidly respond to events and attacks 
throughout their own enterprise, often to multiple simultaneous events at multiple 
security and access levels, while collaborating with other teams to ensure adequate 
information sharing. 
2. Real-Time Distributed Systems 
Chapter III introduces a software architecture that is well suited for a cyberspace 
defense system known as real-time distributed middleware.   
Distributed and real-time computing concepts are discussed in the context of 
intrusion detection, network security and cyberspace defense and how each contributes to 
various networking requirements, and when combined, present an extremely desirable set 
of technology characteristics for cyberspace defense. 
Under the context of integrated real-time software design solutions, a discussion 
of middleware is presented, outlining the three major categories of real-time designs:  
client-server, message passing and publish-subscribe.   
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3. Covert Channel Communications 
Chapter IV introduces covert channel technology and how this unique method of 
communication can be applied in a distributed real-time cyberspace defense system.   
Our discussion of covert channels is from the standpoint that information 
communicated between users of a networked system must be protected from adversary 
detection.  In many cases, simply the presence of communication, or the ability to 
monitor important message traffic, is more valuable to the adversary than mining data 
from the network.  This information can reveal forensic and network defense tactics, 
techniques and procedures that, while not classified, should be protected to the maximum 
extent possible.   
4. Case Study:  The Cyber Operations and Information System 
In order to propose a solution for a full-spectrum command and control and battle 
management cyberspace defense capability, an evaluation of traditional network defense 
technology, real-time distributed system technology as well as covert channel technology 
was performed. 
This program presented in Chapter V brings two areas together; network defense 
and real-time distributed systems technology which effectively represent a near complete 
solution.  We present the main features of this program and conclude with a proposed 
strategy to integrate the missing piece; covert channel communications. 
B. OBJECTIVE:  A PROPOSAL FOR A FULL-SPECTRUM DATA-
CENTRIC CYBERSPACE DEFENSE SYSTEM 
In order to achieve the stated objective in a logical and methodical fashion, we 
will breakdown the analysis into three sub-objectives to provide clarification and detail.  
1. Sub-Objective One:  Recognize that Current Network Defense 
Strategies are Inadequate 
The first sub-objective, detailed in Chapter II, is to provide an in-depth analysis of 
current trends in cyber-space with an acknowledgment that current technological 
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solutions are ineffective and inappropriately organized against the growing threat to 
enterprise networks and cyber-space in particular.   
2. Sub-Objective Two:  Recognize that Future Network Defense and 
Cyberspace Defense Systems must Focus on Information-Centric 
Distributed Systems versus Network-Centric Client-Server Designs 
The second sub-objective, detailed in Chapter III, is to provide a proposed 
solution to the architectural challenges raised by Chapter II. In other words, recognizing 
that traditional network-centric cyber-defense solutions, the focus of current and future 
DoD network defense, are inadequate and inappropriately organized, what technology is 
the most effective or better suited?  We propose an information-centric distributed system 
model incorporating open standard publish-subscribe middleware as a foundation for 
developing a full-spectrum cyberspace defense and C2 capability.   
3. Sub-Objective Three:  Recognize that Critical C2 and Battle 
Management (BM) Communications in a Network Defense 
Environment must be Protected from Adversary Interception 
The third sub-objective, detailed in Chapter IV, is to provide an analysis of covert 
channel communication theories and technology and propose a methodology whereby 
critical communication within a cyber-defense system is protected from adversary 
interception, maintaining security and integrity of operational capabilities of the 
organization and its mission. 
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II. THE STATE OF CYBER DEFENSE 
The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all 
action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in 
addition not infrequently — like the effect of a fog or moonshine — gives 
to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance.  
Carl von Clausewitz [3] 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on several complex issues that lay the foundation for a new 
approach to network security which is fraught with uncertainty and complexity.  As 
Clausewitz points out, warfare, at its very core, deals with uncertainty.  It is imperative 
therefore that network defense consider the uncertainty of cyberspace, to address and 
overcome both threats in cyberspace, and the cyber “fog of war.”  
We begin with a brief discussion of the history of network security and that while 
not a new subject, the numbers and types of threats are constantly changing, creating an 
extremely difficult environment to protect.  We then look at several examples of how 
specific attacks can be used by an adversary to gain control of a host or network and 
gather vital intelligence or steal data without detection.  A critical conclusion from these 
examples is that the enemy has had a long presence on the specific networks and has 
amassed a great deal of information about the network he uses to avoid detection for as 
long as possible. 
A large part of the problem with respect to network security is not that there is a 
threat on the networks.  Rather, it is that network strategists have adopted a sense of 
interoperability and information sharing which provide unprecedented levels of access to 
all network users.  The reality that this dilemma poses is that networks are growing 
increasingly complicated and interconnected. 
Another problem facing network defense strategists in both the public and private 
sector is that of terminology.  That is, how is network defense different from cyberspace 
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defense?  For the purposes of this thesis, we treat network defense (Net D) as a subset of 
cyberspace defense.  For example, a university network that has its own security policies 
and security appliances is practicing network defense.  Cyberspace was recently defined 
by the National Military Strategy to Secure Cyberspace as:  “A domain characterized by 
the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange 
data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures [4].”  In the context of 
information technology, a computer network is broadly defined as:  a system of 
computers, peripherals, terminals and databases connected by communications lines [5].”  
We can add that a computer network is typically organized for a specific purpose (i.e., a 
university network, or a business network, etc.)  Cyberspace, as the National Strategy 
indicates, is inclusive of all electronics, the entire electromagnetic spectrum and 
networked systems.  Thus computer network defense (Net D) is a subset of cyberspace 
defense.     
B. NETWORK VULNERABILITIES 
1. Network Security is not a New Concept 
The need to protect computers and networks of computer systems is not new.  
One of the earliest reports acknowledging the need to address computer security was 
commissioned as a result of a 1967 Advanced Research Projects Agency Task Force to 
study and recommend computer security safeguards in order to protect classified 
information.  The now famous “Ware Report”, published in 1970 is considered the first 
documented requirement to formally define computer security, and the measures 
necessary to ensure information and computer systems remain protected.  In capturing the 
essence of his charter, Ware stated: 
A basic principle underlying the security of computer systems has 
traditionally been that of isolation--simply removing the entire system to a 
physical environment in which penetrability is acceptably minimized.  The 
increasing use of systems in which some equipment components, such as 
user access terminals, are widely spread geographically has introduced 
new complexities and issues.  These problems are not amenable to 
solution through the elementary safeguard of physical isolation [6]. 
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That the researchers and authors of this report had the foresight to recognize the 
growing use of interconnected resources is outstanding.  However, the fact that we are 
still struggling with the security implications first identified in 1970 is troublesome. 
2. Phishing:  The User as an Unwitting Accomplice 
Social engineering bypasses all technologies, including firewalls. 
Kevin Mitnick [7] 
One of the most insidious examples of breeching network defenses is the 
relatively recent trend of phishing.  In the most common usage, phishing is associated 
with the release of email spam for the purposes of harvesting personal information to 
facilitate identity theft or to release trojan malware to gain access to the network.  
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), the practice of phishing as 
well as the term used to describe it dates back to 1996 when AOL accounts were stolen 
by sending email that appeared to originate from AOL, to users requesting their personal 
information [8]. 
The U.K. based Millersmiles.com, which tracks online phishing scams has a 
current database of 675 public companies that are, or have been, the target of a total of 
nearly 400,000 separate incidents [9].  Additionally, the U.S. Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) lists phishing as the number one type of incident reported in the 
second quarter of 2008 where 72.5% of all incidents during that timeframe were phishing 
incidents (Figure 1) a dramatic increase from the first quarter report of 45% in February 
2008 [10].  
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Figure 1 - U.S. CERT Top Five Incidents vs. All Others From [10] 
  
While phishing attacks are typically associated with spam email, identity theft, 
credit card scams and in some cases with denial of service (DOS) attacks, it wasn’t until 
recently that the connection between well organized armies of computers under unified 
control and phishing scams was known.   
3. The Link between Phishing and Botnets 
The FBI has recently reported the connection of phishing emails, or unsolicited 
emails that suspiciously request users click unknown links or provide personal 
information, with the growing threat from botnets [11].  Botnets (or roBOT NETworkS) 
are the legions of computers running malware that allows a botnet herder to control the 
botnet for the purposes of sending out more spam (to collect more bots for the net), or to 
act as relays during Distributed Denial of Service attacks.  This application of phishing 
represents one broad-based use from the criminal element.  
In fact, Botnets have shown promise in criminal circles as being extremely 
versatile by storing large amounts of stolen personal information and by being the launch 
point for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and for sending spam which clogs 
our inboxes.  
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One innovative solution proposed by Williamson [12], suggests developing a 
government controlled botnet to protect against adversary DDoS attacks.  This capability 
would require a central control authority that could command and control the botnet to 
maximize effectiveness while minimizing collateral damage.  While provocative and 
guaranteed to illicit discussions about cyberspace operations and non-kinetic warfare, 
controlling a botnet with the degree of precision necessary to avoid unintended collateral 
damage or second and third order effects would be unrealistic.  Further, the potential for 
an adversary to hijack a U.S. military botnet and use it against our own, or coalition, 
forces would unnecessarily risk national policy and world opinion. 
4. Spear-Phishing 
Spear-phishing is a variation of the phishing scam which incorporates a more 
tailored approach to exploiting network defenses.  The SANS Institute describes spear-
phishing as, “a highly targeted phishing attack.” [13] Spear-phishing methodology differs 
from normal phishing emails in that whereas a normal phishing email relies on large 
numbers of the same email message being released by a botnet or other spam relay, a 
spear-phishing attack, specifically targets a small group of people in one company, or 
even a specific individual by using familiar references in the email, in hopes of gaining 
their trust to click on a link or provide personal information.  In fact, that is precisely 
where the traditional mind-set of network defense and cyber-security has failed since the 
Ware Report first identified the problems of network security in 1970; defense against 
social networking attacks. 
Phishing and spear-phishing represent a type of threat that traditional network 
defense has been unsuccessful at thwarting.  This is due to the fact that the social-
engineering required to convince the intended target that the email is real, is so well 
executed, and so well researched that most users are not aware that they have become 
unwitting accomplices in the impending attack or identity theft.  While most intrusion 
detection and prevention systems are able to detect the presence of malware based hard 
coded scripts (Java, Visual Basic, etc.) a hyper-link is typically not scanned due to 
resource and technological constraints required to track links back to their referring site 
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and determine the site’s intent.  Additionally, verifying and authenticating the identity of 
the sender is an extremely difficult challenge given the availability of anonymizers and 
other botnet obfuscation tools available on the internet.    
C. THE ADVERSARY IS ALREADY ON OUR NETWORK – AND IS HERE 
TO STAY 
Never underestimate the time, expense, and effort an opponent will expend 
to break a code.  
Robert Morris, Retired NSA Scientist, 1995 [14] 
 
1. Organized Persistent Network Intrusions 
In December 2007, Dr. Ron Ritchey of Booz|Allan|Hamilton, presented a 
sobering picture of what happens when a well organized attacker is able to leverage the 
access gained from a spear-phishing attack [15]. In his presentation, he outlined two 
cases of prominent organizations with security policies that were the subject of repeated 
and prolonged network attacks.  What is most striking about these two incidents is not 
simply that they occurred, but the level of sophistication with which they were executed 
by the attackers and by the obvious doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) 
that were employed during the attacks. 
a. Case 1 
The forensic analysis provided by Dr. Ritchey’s team revealed that the 
attackers were choosing their targets with skill and much care, and that the network had 
been compromised for months.  Key points from his analysis of this case: 
 - Client executives and key employees have been attacked with highly 
targeted and sophisticated spear-phishing attacks 
 -  The attackers are collecting data from key technical users 
 -  The attackers appear to focus on the target’s defense-related sites 
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 - The target’s corporate network has been fully compromised at least since 
Mar 2007, although the attackers probably have been on the network for much longer 
Dr. Ritchey’s analysis further identified that the attackers were able to re-
compromise several systems just hours after malicious code had been eradicated from 
them.  Additionally, the attackers were using extreme caution and were utilizing 
countermeasures to prevent the analysis team from identifying the malicious code being 
employed [15].   
b. Case 2 
The second example involved a major corporation with over 100,000 
employees and a strong security program.  Despite their vulnerability assessments and 
scanning, firewalls, network and host-based IDS, and a well-trained security team, their 
systems were compromised as much as with the first example.  Dr. Ritchey’s team 
discovered that keyloggers were widely deployed allowing the attackers to profile and 
perform long-term intelligence gathering on specific employees and the overall 
organization [15]. 
Clearly these two cases represent a much more than a relatively simple 
case of identity theft.  What is important to understand is that the initial vector to achieve 
access to the network in Dr. Ritchey’s examples and the ability to phish for personal 
credit card information against a private citizen is the same.  The weakness is in the 
psychological vulnerability of the network, i.e., the person behind the keyboard.  The 
dangerous link in these two examples is that knowing which person to target and then 
exploiting that person can, and in many cases, allow access to deeper enclaves within the 
enterprise network.  While the protection of data from exfiltration, corruption or deletion 
is a major concern for many network defense strategists, some of these networks and 
systems are more than just data repositories.  
2. Threats to Critical Infrastructure 
 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems represent one of the 
major concerns for many in government and private sectors and an area that must be 
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addressed by DoD cyberspace defense strategists.  As with traditional enterprise networks 
such as corporate or military information technology, SCADA systems exist as a subset 
of cyberspace.   In other words, they are interconnected.  Just as the Federal 
Government’s level of interconnectedness is growing, so is the information sharing 
throughout the various sectors of the U.S. infrastructure such as power, transportation and 
water.   
In fact, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace lists “Developing a 
comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of 
the United States” as one of its top responsibilities [16]. While this document was 
published in Feb 2003, nearly five years later, security experts are publishing results that 
SCADA systems which run and regulate the nations utility and critical infrastructure 
systems are increasingly vulnerable due to increased access and information sharing 
programs [17].  
3. The Chinese Threat 
There is probably no greater potential threat to the U.S. information infrastructure, 
and arguably all of cyberspace, than the People’s Republic of China.  Examples of 
Chinese incursions into networks across the globe are released daily and are the subject 
of intense scrutiny and study to determine precise attribution (whether they are in fact 
state sponsored, or simply rogue elements within the PRC) doctrine and intent.  In 
Secretary of Defense’s 2008 report on the growing Chinese cyber warfare capabilities, it 
states [18]. 
In the past year, numerous computer networks around the world, including those 
owned by the U.S. Government, were subject to intrusions that appear to have originated 
within the PRC.  These intrusions require many of the skills and capabilities that would 
also be required for computer network attack.  Although it is unclear if these intrusions 
were conducted by, or with the endorsement of, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or 
other elements of the PRC government, developing computer network attack capabilities 
is consistent with authoritative PLA writings on this subject [18]. 
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In line with the examples of highly organized intrusions provided by Dr. Ritchey, 
the Secretary of Defense’s report further states: “In 2007, the DoD, other U.S. 
Government agencies and department and defense-related think tanks and contractors 
experienced multiple computer network intrusions, many of which appeared to have 
originated in the PRC [18].”  This statement confirms that not only are DoD networks a 
target for foreign governments like the PRC, but that they are vulnerable and exploitable.  
Regrettably, the DoDs vulnerability is compounded by the trend of interconnecting 
between agencies and information sharing at the federal, state and local levels following 
the events of September 11, 2001.   
4. Threat Assessment from the Director of National Intelligence 
The Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) Information Sharing Environment 
(ISE) is one example where the isolation of networks prevented the possible fusion of 
information which some contend could have helped to mitigate some of the precursor 
events to 9/11.  The unintended consequence of information sharing and interoperability 
initiatives, particularly at the scope of the DNI’s ISE, raises the stakes of risk and cyber 
warfare to a national level and ultimately a national problem.  Acknowledging this cyber 
risk to the nations infrastructure, the DNI, Mr. Michael McConnell, recently gave his 
Annual Threat Assessment before the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.  
During this 27 Feb, 2008 statement, Mr. McConnell stated: 
The United States information infrastructure, including 
telecommunications and computer networks and systems, and most 
importantly the data that resides on these systems is critical to virtually 
every aspect of our modern life.  Threats to our intelligence infrastructure 
are an important focus of this community.  We assess that nation-states – 
which include of course, Russia and China – long have had the technical 
capability to target U.S. information systems for intelligence collection. 
Today, those countries and others could target our information 
infrastructure for data degradation or data destruction.  Data destruction 
as opposed to data exploitation is of increasing concern because of the 
potential impact on U.S. and the global economy should such perpetrators 
be successful [19]. 
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 The HASC Chairman, Senator Thune (D-MI) later asked Mr. McConnell what 
type of cyberspace threat he viewed as the most dangerous; and is DNI prepared to deal 
with those threats from either a civil or military aspect.  To which Mr. McConnell simply 
stated: 
 Sir, we’re not prepared to deal with it [19]. 
 Mr. McConnell continues by saying: 
…our worry right now is the military’s probably the best protected.  The 
federal government is not well-protected and the private sector is not well-
protected.  So the question is, how do we take some of the things that 
we’ve developed for the military side, scale them across the federal 
government.  And the key question will be, how do we interact with the 
private sector? [19] 
D. NETWORK VULNERABILITIES ARE INCREASING 
1. Complexity of the GIG 
As networks and technology becomes more complex, as the number of lines of 
code written to implement this new, complex technology increases by orders of 
magnitude, and as the interconnectedness of corporate and enterprise networks increase 
to the point where there is no real physical distinction between different domains, the 
defense of those computers and networks becomes equally complex, challenging and 
often mired in the same technology intended to protect the same networks. 
The 2007 Global Information Grid (GIG) Architectural Vision highlights the 
increasing complexity that military Cyberspace leaders are confronted with [20]. As 
Figure 2 conveys the network-centric GIG is based on a myriad connections throughout 
the GIG architecture to maximize information sharing and interoperability.  The 




Figure 2 - The Network-Centric GIG From [20] 
 
The disadvantage to this type of architecture, however, is that there are too many 
connections and too many networks over which to realistically maintain control.  At the 
bottom of Figure 2, the interfaces identified in the Vision document clearly indicate the 
numerous connection points that make a unified network defense strategy challenging; 
non-DoD Intelligence, Allied and Coalition network interfaces, other Federal Agencies 
which do not have strict network policy management or enforcement, and “other 
Partners”.  Each of these entities has their own security policies and priorities which may 
or may not be compatible with our own.  Each has different levels of funding which 
manifest in varying types of technology solutions, again which may or may not be 
compatible with our own.  Despite these differences and challenges, the task remains to 
interconnect and share information to the extent possible, ostensibly to improve our 
operational capability, efficiency and security.  However, this charter seems in direct 
conflict with our ability to protect and defend that same “open” architecture.     
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2. Sacrificing Security for the Sake of Being Inter-connected 
The quest for increasing interconnectedness becomes even more of a network 
security liability when other critical infrastructure applications and networks are factored 
into the enterprise defense strategy. 
Large-scale infrastructures that provide nationwide mission-critical services are 
usually managed (or at least regulated) by a national central authority.  An example is the 
U.S. National Power Grid [21]. Thus mission critical networks must survive and 
interoperate within an un-trusted heterogeneous environment [21]. The implications of 
this model suggest that protection must rely on “local surveillance” and “global 
coordination and control”. 
Local protection addresses the boundary protection and hardening of local 
network infrastructure but does not address the external threats that are increasingly the 
threat (i.e., Distributed Denial of Service attacks, phishing, pharming1, etc.) 
The future threats to the infrastructure will involve numerous protection domains 
as victims or unwilling collaborators.  There is a need, therefore, to create a nationwide 
security infrastructure that enables the correlation of security-related information coming 
from different subsystems to obtain a global view of the security state of the 
infrastructure and that enables command and control capabilities from a central or 
distributed control station [21].  
The ability to integrate the information coming from different parts of the 
network, to coordinate countermeasures, and possibly to counterattack is vital [21]. 
Remote connections and organizations with geographically separated divisions or units 
are particularly vulnerable since they are used to dealing with Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) or remote access connections which can show large volumes of data flowing back 
and forth.  Identifying a rogue connection and isolating it from valid connections can 
become increasingly problematic. 
                                                 
1 Pharming refers to the relatively recent practice of large scale social engineering or redirecting large 
numbers of users to malicious web sites through techniques such as DNS poisoning.   
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3. Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) 
In January 1998, things changed for military Information Technology.  This 
marked the release of Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and Mr. Dan Garstka’s article in 
the U.S. Navy’s “Proceedings” magazine entitled, “Network Centric Warfare – Its Origin 
and Future”.  This article, along with Alberts, Garstka, and Stein’s, “Network Centric 
Warfare – Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority”, set the stage for 
embracing a technological revolution in military affairs (RMA) of sorts, where the fog 
and friction of war would be eliminated, or at least reduced, through the implementation 
and adoption of technology as a warfighting capability.   
The authors of “Network Centric Warfare” further define it as:  “an information 
superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by 
networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, 
increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of self synchronization.” [22]  However, the technological 
hubris of the authors state that “In essence, NCW translates information superiority into 
combat power by linking knowledgeable entities in the battle-space.”   
For the authors of NCW, the concept of information superiority was born from the 
business world and the ability to dominate competition and a competitive advantage by 
applying the principles of network-centric operations.  They assumed that an increase in 
access to relevant, accurate and timely information would have the same effect on war 
and warfighting as it did in the business world. 
Clearly, DoD has embraced technology-centric warfighting as a way to address 
forced downsizing and budget constraints as well as an increase in operational 
effectiveness.  In fact, many of DoD online portals and information technology vision 
statements extol the virtue of network-centric warfare and advocate technology as a 
critical warfighting enabler and force multiplier [23], [24]. The concern from a network 
security standpoint, is how integral these systems have become in day-to-day warfighting 
and how reliant military leaders and decision-makers have become on them for even the 
most routine functional services.  The final analysis for strategies such as NCW is that the 
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DoD has passed the point of no return and that these command and control, common 
operational picture, situational awareness, and all-source data fusion systems must be 
protected as vital components of the military’s arsenal.  However, each system is 
connected and inter-connected in unique ways, often incorporating separate data feeds for 
weather, intelligence, logistics, medical, personnel or some other data source.  These 
feeds and the aggregate system, or system of systems, can then be connected at various 
levels throughout the GIG architecture, as shown previously in Figure 3, exacerbating an 
already complex architecture.   Additionally, this construct does not include the network 
security constraints imposed by business process rules, budgeting, manpower, and other 
forms of compartmentalization which exacerbates the network security challenges and 
vulnerability of the GIG. 
4. The Host-Based Security System (HBSS) 
The primary component of the current and future U.S. military network defense 
strategy is known as the Host-Based Security System (HBSS). 
HBSS is a DoD enterprise-wide Information Assurance (IA) tool, based on the 
McAfee electronic Policy Orchestrator (ePO) product, available to support the 
Information Assurance and Vulnerability Management (IAVM) program and ensure 
secure network operations. HBSS provides centralized management of host-based 
capabilities and enforcing standard configurations of host machines, monitors and blocks 
intrusions, provides automatic signature updates, and provides capability to monitor 
security status from centralized console [25]. 
Traditionally, DoD information systems have been protected by implementing 
security tools such as firewalls and anti-virus software just inside the perimeter of the 
network.  Although this protects the network from some threats and vulnerabilities, it 
isn’t completely effective from attacks that focus on social engineering and other 
malicious software exploits.   
HBSS provides the most common type of host-based protection in the form of 
desktop anti-virus software that identifies and stops known viruses.  It also provides a 
desktop firewall solution.  HBSS includes an Intrusion Detection/Prevention System at 
the network interface and operating system level sniffing for malicious activity.  If it 
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detects malicious activity, the IDS terminate the offending activity and send an alert to 
security personnel.  The IPS protects computers against malicious activity such as worms 
and Trojans.   
Because HBSS is a DoD program, when it is finally implemented DoD-wide, 
HBSS is intended to provide visibility and reporting on the health of DoD the enterprise 
information system (i.e., the GIG.)  Although HBSS is implemented at the host level, it is 
managed in a single, central location for each enterprise network. With policies, 
vulnerability patches and compliance scans flowing from the high-levels to each host 
within the enterprise scope of responsibility. 
The DoD Host-Based Security System provides: 
- Defense-in-depth 
- Centralized management of host-based capabilities 
- Automated Information Condition (INFOCON) support 
- Host-based firewall 
- Host-based Intrusion Protection 
- Malicious activity damage limitation 
The DoD HBSS also prevents:  
- Buffer overflow attacks 
- Unauthorized execution of code 
-- Access to files 
-- Transmission of data (data exfiltration) 
- System degradation 
The DoD HBSS: 
- Enforces standard desktop configuration 
- Mitigates “some” insider threats 
- Detects rogue systems 
 
The Department of Defense, through the Joint Task Force for Global Network 
Operations (JTF-GNO) and under the authority of United States Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM) intends to deploy the HBSS solution which includes the IPS client, 
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Configuration Management Agent (CMA) and Asset 2500 (compliance software) client 
on over 5,000,000 servers, workstations and laptops throughout DoD. 
At the heart of the DoD HBSS is the electronic Policy Orchestrator (ePO) as 
shown in Figure 3.  The ePO is the component that stores the policies and executes the 
distribution and management of enforced policies at the client level. 
 
 
Figure 3 - DoD McAfee-based HBSS System From [25] 
 
The ePO servers are intended to be placed strategically throughout the GIG to 
ensure each of the estimated 5,000,000 servers, workstations and laptops are protected 
and tied into the HBSS network.  Each ePO is tied to the primary policy server which is 
controlled and updated at the DoD level by JTF-GNO.   
One aspect of any enterprise defense system must be to ensure that the network is 
not made more vulnerable as a result of its deployment.  While HBSS represents “a” 
solution to managing the defense of the GIG, there question remains whether HBSS will 
make DoD more vulnerable through the introduction of a monolithic, commercially 
available, single-vendor network security solution.   
For example, a quick scan of known software exploits in the US-CERTs list of 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) reveals that earlier ePO versions have 
been exploited several times in the recent past.   
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Vulnerability of the entire HBSS could result from the dynamic link library 
software that drives the agent on the host, or if sophisticated enough, on the ePO server 
itself.  For example, the ePO “logDetail()” Format String Vulnerability (CVE-2008-1357) 
could, when exploited, cause a denial of service or allow an attacker to take complete 
control of an affected system [26].   
Additional vulnerabilities from the U.S.-CERT National Vulnerability Database 
(NVD) include:   
CVE-2007-1498: Multiple stack based buffer overflows allow remote 
attackers to execute arbitrary code [27]. 
CVE-2006-5271: Integer underflow allowing arbitrary code execution 
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted UDP packet causing 
stack corruption [28]. 
CVE-2006-5272: Stack based buffer overflow allowing remote attackers 
to execute arbitrary code [29]. 
CVE-2006-5273: Heap-based buffer overflow allowing remote attackers 
to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet [30]. 
CVE-2006-5274: Integer overflow allowing remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code [31]. 
While these threats might seem few in number, the potential impact to the DoD 
infrastructure is enormous given the mandated reliance on this single vendor strategy by 
order of Communications Tasking Order (CTO) 07-012 which states: 
The Commander, USSTRATCOM and the Commander, Joint Task Force - 
Global Network Operations have identified host computer defense as 
critical to the protection of the GIG.  To protect this vital component of 
the GIG, HBSS is mandated for installation on all unclassified systems in 
the DoD, including Programs of Record. JTF-GNO CTO 07-012 [32] 
Given that the details of this implementation are not protected information, that 
the approved solution is commercially available software, and there are organized threats  
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that have the technical capability, motivation and intent to penetrate U.S. computer 
systems, it seems logical to assume that an adversary entity is already analyzing 
McAfee’s HBSS ePO solution for weakness. 
The limits of the U.S. domestic cyberspace include the federal, state and local 
government systems as well as the educational, corporate, domestic, coalition and private 
sectors of cyberspace.  Many of these segments are interconnected to the DoD GIG 
through contractor, research and development (R&D), educational and even morale 
internet connections.  Each connection increases the vulnerability of the network through 
the introduction of different2 defense policies and procedures.  These external 
connections of cyberspace are not covered by the Air Force’s expenditures in network 
defense and will not be connected into the HBSS network. 
E. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO CYBERSPACE DEFENSE 
1. Cannot “Plug the Dyke” 
While many senior leaders have lived through the apparent technology driven 
Network Centric RMA described by Adm Cebrowski, it is clear that connectivity and 
interoperability have come at great cost.  As our ability to communicate and interoperate 
has increased, so have the numbers of attack vectors and exploitable vulnerabilities 
within those same increasingly complex networks.  Our span of control has grown to 
insurmountable levels while the quest for increasingly complex implementations of 
technology are being sought to “plug the dyke” of network threats.  
While much has been said on the subject of a “Cyber 9/11” [33], or “Digital Pearl 
Harbor” [34] in terms of enterprise defense strategy and congressional testimony, not as 
much high-level attention or emphasis has been placed on the low level threats such as 
spear-phishing and other social-engineering based attacks.  Additionally, while a “cyber 
9/11” may represent a high-consequence event, the probability is extremely low.  
Conversely, a relatively low consequence event such as phishing attack has an extremely 
                                                 
2 As systems become more interconnected, so do the firewall rule sets that exist to protect each 
individual network system.  Without significant analysis, competing firewall rules can render enterprise 
networks more vulnerable, or in extreme cases inaccessible due to highly restrictive ports and protocol 
blocks.  See Chapter III(B) for more information on this subject. 
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high probability of occurring.  Thus, given the knowledge that phishing attacks are the 
most prevalent type of attack vector, and given the knowledge that phishing is not just for 
spam distribution but to gain access to enterprise networks, it would seem more logical 
that the majority of our enterprise information technology resources (e.g., funding) would 
be dedicated to both current and future network defense technology; including 
procurement and R&D. 
2. Proposed Solutions 
a. Intrusion Detection Systems 
Fundamental to enterprise security is intrusion detection and intrusion 
prevention.  While IDS focuses primarily on analysis of network traffic in an offline 
mode, intrusion prevention is designed to be an inline capability.  In other words, an IDS 
indicates an event that has already happened, while an intrusion prevention system (IPS) 
indicates an event that is about to occur.  Data rates, processing speeds, policy 
management, etc., are all contributing factors to help decide whether to employ one type 
of technology over another, or both. 
IDSs for example, are far from perfect and may produce both false 
positives and non-relevant positives.  Non-relevant positives are alerts that correctly 
identify an attack, but the attack fails to meet its objective [21].  In terms of limiting the 
amount of traffic detectable by an adversary who might be gathering intelligence 
regarding a networks defensive capability, IDSs are very noisy.  In addition to false 
positives, they produce alerts with different levels of relevance.  As a consequence, the 
effectiveness of alert correlation is negatively affected by the poor quality of the input 
alert stream [21]. 
Regardless of which technology is preferred by the security professional, 
the absence of integrated, enterprise-wide security monitoring and management may 
impede an enterprise’s ability to respond rapidly and intelligently to cyber attacks.   
This is the dilemma facing many network security strategists:  Our 
networks are growing increasingly complex, they are connected to too many external 
sources, there is not enough standardization and enforcement of standards when they do 
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exist and laying more technology onto an already complex environment is simply making 
things more difficult to manage and defend. 
At least one aspect of network defense can be addressed without 
technology; the social engineering vulnerability.  Phishing, or spear-phishing, exploits the 
human dimension of network defense.  For not even the most sophisticated firewall or 
IDS can prevent a user from giving their personal information away if they have been 
lulled into a false sense of security.  Additionally, since many corporate or government 
enterprise users feel “safe” behind the de-militarized zone (DMZ), firewalls, IDS and 
other network security features of their networks, it could be argued that when a phishing 
email does arrive in their inbox they are even more likely to trust the source since they 
feel their company would not endanger their network environment by letting 
unauthorized email through.  However, as has been seen, spear-phishing and other 
tailored forms of phishing attacks have been successful in breaching enterprise security, 
not just the average home user.  Coupled with the enterprise threat, many users of 
government and corporate networks take their work home and through Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) or Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connections are able to work from home.  
The practice of telecommuting or remote access introduces a whole new set of “hosts” to 
the enterprise that are not subject to the JTF-GNO CTO mandating HBSS protection.  If a 
home computer then, already has a backdoor (installed via a phishing, or other malicious 
attack) and the user accesses the corporate network via VPN, bypassing the firewall and 
IDS monitoring software has been made trivial for the attacker.   
b. Future Technology-based Network Defense Solutions 
While it is generally accepted that the term and practice of phishing (e.g., 
collecting personal account data from America Online users) has been around since 1996, 
the technology to counter the threat as well as mainstream attempts to educate users 
against the growing threat, has not kept pace.  Some in the security industry have 
predicted that the technology to perform deep packet, content and contextual analysis is 
at least two generations away [35].  If current trends are any indication, the attackers will 
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have developed new methods of exploiting networks and social engineering 
vulnerabilities rendering future solutions obsolete before they are even fielded.   
The positive aspect of this trend is that network security is moving from 
perimeter security to internal network security and protecting smaller groups of workers 
and business units versus the enterprise as a whole; as with HBSS for example.  
However, as previously stated, as the trend of interoperability becomes more pervasive 
and information sharing becomes more ubiquitous, the lines between the network 
boundaries becomes more blurry making network defense more challenging.   
c. Network Defense as a National Strategy 
For the Air Force, the first step was recognizing the warfighting domain of 
cyberspace [4].  The next steps included thinking about network defense from this 
holistic viewpoint which means building security solutions for systems in cyberspace 
versus systems on an enterprise network.   
Understanding this distinction will be critical to moving towards a 
capability that both protects resources and provides a mechanism to command and 
control (C2) the network defense capabilities that they are tasked to protect.   
The United States Government has recognized the requirement to develop 
this type of unified defense capability and has captured this, and other aspects of 
cyberspace security requirements, in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (NSSC) 
published in 2003.  In fact, the NSSC defines as its top priority, establishing a National 
Cyberspace Security Response System; which includes eight major actions [36]. 
 1.  Establish public-private architecture for responding to national-level 
cyber incidents; 
 2.  Provide for the development of tactical and strategic analysis of cyber 
attacks and vulnerability assessments; 
 3.  Encourage the development of private sector capability to share a 
synoptic view of the health of cyberspace; 
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 4.  Expand the Cyber Warning and Information Network to support the 
role of DHS in coordinating crisis management for cyberspace security; 
 5.  Improve national incident management; 
 6.  Coordinate processes for voluntary participation in the development of 
national public-private continuity and contingency plans; 
 7.  Exercise cyber security continuity plans for federal systems; and 
 8.  Improve and enhance public-private information sharing involving 
cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities 
The recognition of both the reliance on and vulnerability of cyberspace 
has raised alarms at the highest levels of the government and as a result, the president’s 
budget has redirected billions of dollars towards research and development to meet this 
looming threat [37], [38]. 
Additionally, significant R&D requirements have been identified in the 
Federal Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance Research and Development 
plan [39].  This comprehensive plan takes the first steps towards developing a national 
R&D agenda by pulling private-sector, academia as well as governments at the local, 
state and federal levels together for the first time.  The ultimate objective of this R&D 
initiative is to strengthen the security of the Nation’s Information Technology 
infrastructure [39].  Addressing the major findings and conclusions from the report will 
take many years and will likely suffer the effects of funding, political priorities and other 
programmatic impediments but the important step of identifying the national R&D 
shortfalls and technology gaps has been taken. 
d. Incident Response 
While the majority of the actions in the NSSC’s Response System 
requirement focus on information sharing, collaboration and coordination, improving 
national incident management will provide the most significant benefit to the national 
level and will provide a model for incident management capabilities at other levels of 
federal, state, local and private enterprise networks [16].   
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Within the United States, the organization tasked with national level 
incident response responsibility is a Computer Security Incident Response Team 
(CSIRT); a function of the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (U.S.-
CERT), which is the operational component of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
National Cyber Security Division [40]. 
The U.S.-CERT defines an incident as the act of violating an explicit or 
implied security policy which include but are not limited to [41]. 
- Attempts (either failed or successful) to gain unauthorized access to a 
system or its data 
- Unwanted disruption or denial of service 
- The unauthorized use of a system for the processing or storage of data 
- Changes to system hardware, firmware, or software characteristics 
without the owners knowledge, instruction or consent 
Figure 4 captures the complex relationship between the U.S.-CERT, 
tasked with domestic computer security and incident response, and over 250 different 
incident response and security teams around the world including various elements at the 
State, Local and private level.  The U.S.-CERT’s main coordination function is with the 
CERT/Coordination Center (CERT/CC)3 of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at 
Carnegie Mellon University.   
 
                                                 
3 The CERT/Coordination Center is the primary function of the CMU/SEI CERT® program.  CERT®, 
as it applies to CMU/SEI, is not an acronym. 
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Figure 4 - Domestic and International Computer Incident Response 
 
The SEI, a Federally Funded Research and Development program, was 
tasked by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) with establishing a 
computer security coordination center, the CERT® in November 1988 after the “Morris 
Worm” was released which demonstrated the internet’s vulnerabilities to attack [42]. 
One year following the creation of the CERT/CC in 1988, the Forum of 
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) was established.  This organization is 
made up of over 180 member teams around the world and fosters coordination and 
cooperation to meet the growing challenges facing computer security professionals [43].      
Taking an active role in enterprise security and providing the ability to 
respond to intrusions or other security events is a critical capability for an organization 
regardless of size or mission.  However, this is especially true in the U.S. Government 
and the DoD since the Federal Government’s span of control covers the 15 executive 
departments, 130 agencies and other organizations each with unique technical and 
security requirements.  The ability to launch a coordinated response to a computer related 
incident is clearly a challenge.    
Figure 5 shows the 62 U.S. organizations that are members of the FIRST 
organization.  Note that not every agency or department in the Federal Government is 
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represented or covered by the FIRST organizations.  The critical conclusion being that as 
of January 2008, there were approximately 540,000,000 hosts on the internet [44] of 
which only a small percentage are protected by some incident response team.   
 
 
Figure 5 - National FIRST Organizations 
 
Given the growing numbers of attacks on the internet and the increasing 
levels of sophistication of the adversary, and their ability to persist in numerous 
enterprise systems despite hardened defensive postures, the task to protect cyberspace 
appears to be nearly impossible. 
CERTS and incident response teams must better arm themselves with the 
tools to rapidly deploy personnel and resources to contend with attacks.  CERTs and 
IRTs require extensive communication to provide the critical command and control 
necessary to engage and remove the adversary when they are discovered on the network.  
This type of communication, as shown in examples provided by Dr. Ritchey and others, 
provides a great deal of information to anyone “listening” on the network.  As his after 
action report showed, the attackers were monitoring the network for indications that they 
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had been discovered and were able to either move to other less monitored portions of the 
network, or disappear only to return when they knew they were not being monitored.   
Incidence response teams cannot afford to provide the adversary more information than 
they already have, however no tools exist that allow this type of interaction between team 
members and the many reach-back functions they must draw on to perform forensic and 
technical analysis.   
Additionally, response teams are considered a high-demand, low-density 
asset.  This means there are not enough of the highly trained and experienced experts in 
the field of network security, forensics, and incidence response that can handle the 
increasing numbers of threats to the many (and growing) networks.  This type of trained 
cadre of experts cannot be developed overnight.  Organizations like FIRST and the U.S.-
CERT have developed the much needed coordination mechanisms necessary to share 
information and keep others in the field informed but there are still too few “good guys” 
to protect the 540 million hosts [44] from the “bad guys”. 
F. CONCLUSION   
This chapter has focused on several complex issues that lay the foundation for a 
new approach to network security in an environment that is rapidly exceeding our 
capacity to understand with any degree of measurable certainty.  As Clausewitz pointed 
out, warfare, at its very core, deals with uncertainty.  The application of “the fog of war” 
is especially relevant in cyberspace where the manmade domain of electronics and 
technology has no boundaries and no borders.  It is imperative therefore that network 
defense consider the boundary-less, border-less and uncertainty factors of cyberspace, 
and that success is predicated on addressing and overcoming not only the adversarial 
threats in cyberspace, but also the cyber “fog of war.”  
The question posed by this chapter, is whether network defense has kept up with 
the threat and, that in the context of historical network security trends, the most recent 
and most insidious social engineering threats should be analyzed as a basis for future 
enterprise security requirements and solutions.    
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Whether a solution to the cyber threat is about technology (i.e., building the better 
mousetrap), user education, or a combination of the two, what is clear is that the domain 
in which this conflict is occurring is in a constant state of change and therefore requires a 
new…a different…approach to network defense and ultimately to cyberspace defense. 
In terms of traditional, technology-based solutions, future network defense 
strategies must treat cyberspace as a singular environment; the national cyberspace 
defense strategies, including DoD, cannot afford to segregate and isolate network defense 
solutions for networks that are neither segregated nor isolated.  This does not mean 
different organizations cannot establish their own network defense polices and 
capabilities, however they must be created with a fundamental understanding that they 
are part of, and subject to the sometimes hostile environment of, cyberspace. 
Since 1988, teams of highly trained network security professionals have 
organized to respond to direct attacks on networks as well as collaborate on current 
threats and mitigation strategies.  However, these incidence response teams are 
outnumbered in terms of the networks and hosts that need to be protected as well as the 
increasing sophistication of the adversary that poses the threat.   
As a result, new methods of organizing and responding such that the team’s 
presence does not provide intelligence to the adversary must be developed.  This 
technology must also allow the high-demand, low-density teams of network security 
professionals to respond to numerous threats throughout their areas of responsibility 
while collaborating to ensure other teams are aware of current threats.   
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III. REAL-TIME DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 
A. DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING 
A distributed system is one in which components located at networked computers 
communicate and coordinate their actions only by passing messages [45].  Examples of 
distributed systems in every day computing environments are: 
-  The Internet; 
-  Intranets, or sub-component of the internet; 
- Mobile computing environments; 
Looking at the internet as a whole, it becomes obvious as to the motivation to link 
systems together for the purpose of sharing resources towards accomplishing goals or 
objectives.  Tools such as file sharing, email, social networking, etc, are all accomplished 
using numerous resources shared by many users simultaneously.  Resources throughout 
the system can be managed by centralized or distributed servers and accessed by clients 













Figure 6 - Client-Server Based Distributed Systems From [45] 
 
As components of a distributed system are linked together, numerous challenges 
can arise.  Different operating systems, types of hardware platforms, different security 
 34
policies, scalability4 factors, etc., are just some of the challenges facing large scale 
distributed system designs.  When faced with geographically separate systems or hosts, 
issues such as concurrency5, timing6 and independent failure handling7 may have 
significant consequences to the overall network performance characteristics.   
1. Distributed Intrusion Detection 
Applying the principles of distributed computing to Intrusion Detection, or 
network security, is not a new concept.  Snapp (et al) proposed the Distributed Intrusion 
Detection System (DIDS) [46] leveraging much of the work from Denning [47] and Lunt 
[48].    
The DIDS strategy was based on developing usage profiles of network resources 
and then comparing those profiles with historical trends to determine possible security 
violations [46].  Whereas much of the foundational IDS work focused on standalone (i.e., 
closed) networks where collecting and storing log files for large numbers of user data was 
a resource constraint, the proposed DIDS architecture was one of the first systems to 
consider the network connectivity as an attack vector and thus, required its own 
mitigation strategy.  Later applications of the DIDS technology can be seen in intrusion 
detection systems that analyze user behavior patterns in real-time to determine possible 
malicious activity.   
                                                 
4 While there is no universally accepted definition of scalability [99], for the purposes of this thesis the 
general definition is used; scalability refers to growth of computer systems to accommodate increases in 
users, bandwidth, or processing capability such as with routers, switches or operating system processing 
capability.   
5 Concurrency refers to different computers on the same distributed network performing the same 
function at the same time.  Coordination of concurrent processing is critical to successful distributed system 
design [45]. 
6 Timing, or a global clock is also a critical component of distributed system design and refers to the 
mechanism by which message passing is synchronized and disparities resolved, to a specific time standard 
ensuring successful processing of exchanged messages. [45] 
7 Failure handling refers to the concept that each member of the distributed system can, and likely will 
fail, at some point.  The ability to gracefully handle such failures without affecting, or minimizing the 
impact of those failures on, the system as a whole is critical feature of distributed systems [45]. 
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Distributed Intrusion Detection System technology must evolve to protect an 
environment that is growing faster and more complex than traditional single network 
defense systems can handle.  Additional reasons include: [49]: 
-  Attacks that can only be detected by correlating data from multiple locations 
-  Coordinated attacks that require global scope and awareness 
-  Normal user and network patterns increasing false-positive indications 
-  Correlating data to demonstrate intent 
-  Automated attack patterns that overwhelm traditional IDS capability 
-  Numbers of attacks that overwhelm traditional IDS capability 
 A distributed intrusion detection strategy makes sense for a number of reasons but 
primarily because the Internet itself is distributed.  Attacks can come from any location in 
cyberspace without regard to borders, international treaties, or even laws.  More 
importantly though, distributed intrusion detection makes sense because it shifts the 
strategic focus away from protecting the network (i.e., network-centric), to protecting the 
data that traverses the network, that is, data-centric (or information-centric.) 
Responding to a growing need to correlate global intrusion and network attack 
data across cyberspace, several systems have been developed.  Three programs exist 
which cover the spectrum of hobby-shop distributed IDS capability, to global corporate 
coverage: Symantec™ DeepSight™ Threat Management System [50], myNetWatchman 
[51], and the Internet Storm Center (ISC) [52].  Each solution is basically a collection of 
feeds from numerous users throughout cyberspace (i.e., the internet), firewalls, routers, 
etc., that are then processed and correlated into timely, cyber events, threat warning and 
mitigation strategies.   
As with the FIRST organization, which is an organization focused on 
coordinating information for cyber incident response, these “meta” IDS systems are 
virtual organizations without enterprise responsibility or response capability.  These 
systems do provide a model for understanding the complexity of the cyberspace 
environment, however.  The ISC uses the analogy of modeling and tracking global 
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weather patterns where large numbers of sensors placed at strategic locations are 
constantly monitored for temperature, wind, etc.  Individually, the data from the sensors 
is relevant to the local area.  When aggregated and analyzed by skilled network defense 
experts, patterns, trends and events begin to emerge that would not otherwise be 
detectable.  This is the benefit and advantage of distributed Intrusion Detection. 
2. Intrusion Tolerance 
Intrusion tolerant systems represent a relatively new category of computer 
network defense technology recognizing that network intrusions and attacks cannot be 
prevented with 100% certainty.  Therefore, designing systems based purely on intrusion 
detection (reactive defense) or intrusion prevention (proactive defense) ignores the 
likelihood that an adversary can, and in most cases will, breach an enterprises network 
defenses.  As discussed in Chapter Two, social engineering techniques such as phishing 
or spear-phishing exploit the human aspect of computer networks which no IDS or IPS 
technology can mitigate.  For this reason, researchers have developed this class of 
network defense techniques to ensure enterprise networks exhibit characteristics of 
survivability and reliability in the event of an attack to one portion. 
System reliability is an important characteristic and design advantage of 
distributed technology, particularly with network defense strategies which are built upon 
the requirement of operational availability.  Operational availability translates to system 
uptime, which of course is a corollary to reliability and fault tolerance. 
A reliable computer system must be able to cope with the failure of one or more 
of its components. A failed component may exhibit a type of behavior that is often 
overlooked--namely, sending conflicting information to different parts of the system.  
The initial research into developing a methodology to contend with these types of 
system faults in a distributed environment was raised by Akkoyunlu, et al [53] which was 
later given a name to represent the problem:  The Byzantine Generals Problem8: [54] 
                                                 
8 Imagine that several divisions of the Byzantine army are camped outside an enemy city, each 
division commanded by its own general. The generals can communicate with one another only by 
messenger. After observing the enemy, they must decide upon a common plan of action. However, some of 
the generals may be traitors, trying to prevent the loyal generals from reaching agreement. 
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Extending the problem abstract, distributed systems are designed to deal with and 
tolerate arbitrary system faults which are known as byzantine faults; named for the 
original problem which addresses the behavior of inter-process communication and 
messaging.  Systems that are designed to mitigate and survive these types of byzantine 
faults can be referred to as fault tolerant or survivable.  In a distributed intrusion detection 
or intrusion tolerant system, tolerance refers to the ability of the system to survive an 
attack to a segment or portion of the network.  In other words, mechanisms exist within a 
system to isolate the attack, or redundant mechanisms and data exist to ensure survival of 
the network and its resources. 
Approaches to designing and implementing Intrusion Tolerance techniques differ, 
but the end result for any type of ITS is a network capable of withstanding and surviving 
a network attack.  Various solutions to develop an ITS have been proposed by industry 
and academia such as Starfish [55], APOD [56] , ITUA [57], and Willow [58].      
B. REAL-TIME COMPUTING 
Real-time computing is defined as processing or computations that must occur 
within a specified period of time [59].  Systems are further classified as “hard” real-time 
or “soft” real-time, depending on the consequences of failing to meet the time constraint 
imposed.  For example, a hard real-time system such as an automotive airbag system 
must operate within fractions of a second.  The consequences of a misfire could be fatal, 
therefore system tolerances are set such that it either fires on time, or it has failed.  
Conversely, a cell-phone button response routine is considered a soft real-time system 
since the cell-phone operating system must respond before some determined delay but the 
tolerances are much greater and therefore the consequences are not zero. 
For the purposes of intrusion detection and network security, “real-time” implies 
that event correlation and analysis happens as they occur, or as rapidly as otherwise 
possible.  When coupled with distributed systems concepts, real-time requirements 
impose message handling constraints ensuring geographically separated, but related 
events are correlated, analyzed and tracked as single events as they occur.  The 
combination of real-time processing characteristics integrated within a distributed 
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computing environment is an excellent solution for large-scale enterprise networks with 
numerous processing regions and large numbers of hosts.   
Denning [47] outlined additional justification for pursuing real-time IDS 
capability:   
1) Most existing systems have security flaws that render them susceptible 
to intrusions, penetrations, and other forms of abuse; finding and fixing all these 
deficiencies is not feasible for technical and economic reasons;   
2) Existing systems with known flaws are not easily replaced by systems 
that are more secure-mainly because the systems have attractive features that are missing 
in the more-secure systems, or else they cannot be replaced for economic reasons;  
3) Developing systems that are absolutely secure is extremely difficult, if 
not generally impossible; and  
4) Even the most secure systems are vulnerable to abuses by insiders who 
misuse their privileges. 
Network security systems today are increasingly complex and subject to 
numerous rules and overlapping policies [60] that can be exploited rendering networks 
vulnerable.  Thus, the motivating factors that led to Denning’s initial Intrusion Detection 
Expert System design [47] are even more applicable in today’s network environment. 
Figure 7 illustrates the correlation between firewall errors and firewall rule 
complexity which can lead to a decrease in overall network security.  In this chart, Rule 
Complexity (RC) is a function of the number of rules in a firewall policy, the number of 
network objects affected by the rules and the number of network interface cards on the 
firewall itself.  As the chart shows, simple firewall configuration sets are less prone to 
error, however in practice, less effective against external network threats.  Similarly, 
complex firewall sets with multiple interfaces can increase the number of errors, 
decreasing the firewall’s effectiveness. 
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Figure 7 - Firewall Errors versus Firewall Rule Complexity From [60] 
 
As networks grow in complexity and the connections between them increase to 
meet the demands of information sharing and interoperability, the response from network 
defense professionals is to increase the layers of defense.  However, as Figure 16 
indicates, there is more likely and inverse relationship between the defense-in-depth 
complexity and the overall security posture of the network due to the inability and 
complexity of managing such a system effectively.  
Additionally, once these systems are integrated and operational, ostensibly to 
protect the network and users, in many cases the security systems cannot simply be 
removed without catastrophic consequences to the entire network.  For example, critical 
Command and Control systems, or weapon control systems that are tied into mission 
critical network segments would have to be shut down or rebooted to accommodate 
security upgrades leaving vital defense systems and personnel vulnerable to attack.  This 
is usually not an option for military leaders. 
And lastly, there are no completely secure networks.  Even those that are not 
connected to the internet or another closed system are still vulnerable to insider threat, 
misuse, defective code or some other form of security threat. 
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C. REAL-TIME DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING SYSTEMS AND 
STANDARDS 
The delivery and receipt of information or messages is a critical component to 
real-time systems.  In a distributed environment, message predictability, reliability, 
integrity become extremely challenging and a primary concern for system architects as 
well as network defense professionals.   Factors such as bandwidth, processing capacity, 
network topology, security policies, operating system and hardware heterogeneity, etc., 
all contribute to the complexity of real-time messaging and information flow.   
Middleware applies a software layer of abstraction to address and contend with 
these various factors.  The term, middleware, defines a broad group of software and 
standards that assist programmers and system developers of distributed systems to ensure 
messages and information flow between various computers, servers, databases, etc., are 
able to communicate and operate effectively and efficiently.   Middleware typically falls 
into one of three broad classes to meet these requirements: 
1. Client-Server 
Client-server has been the mainstay of networked systems for many years.  
Servers include machines that store or produce data, while clients are machines that 
request data.  Client machines run an Application Programmer Interface (API) that allows 
the server to appear local to the client side.  Middleware in a client-server configuration 
calls methods, Remote Method Invocation (RMI) on remote objects as though they were 
on the local machine, thus hiding the true topology of the network.  Examples of client-
server middleware include CORBA, DCOM and Enterprise JavaBeans (EJB) [61]. 
Client server architectures work well in systems with centralized data production, 
where many users access a central data repository—a one-to-many configuration.  
However, if there are multiple nodes generating data, a more complex data storing and 
distribution mechanism must be employed to ensure the right information gets to the 
servers for later redistribution of the data.   
These configurations do not tend to scale efficiently as they typically utilize 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) to send information between clients and the server.  
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While TCP incorporates reliability in that it retries dropped packets, etc., it does not 
incorporate delivery semantics such as quality of service.  Additionally, since TCP 
requires dedicated resources for each connection maintaining large numbers of these 
connections for large networks becomes inefficient affecting the overall scalability of the 
client-server environment [61]. 
2. Message Passing 
Message passing architectures implement queues of messages as the basic design 
philosophy.  Processes can create queues, send messages, and service messages that 
arrive, extending the client-server design to a more distributed architecture.  At a basic 
level, message passing simplifies the exchange of information between many nodes on 
the network.   
Despite the improvements over basic client-server system design, a message 
processing architecture does not support a data-centric9 model of handling information 
due to the connection required between sender and reciever.  Additionally, message 
passing systems rarely allow control over the messaging behaviors or QoS 
characteristics; messages flow and are received when produced or processed with similar 
expecations and delivery semantics [61].   
3. Publish-Subscribe 
In simplest terms, publish-subscribe middleware adds a data-centric model to 
messaging in the distributed environment.  Publish-subscribe nodes simply “subscribe” to 
data they need, and “publish” information they produce with messages logically passing 
directly between nodes.  This model implies both discovery and delivery criteria which, 
when coupled with message handling policies (e.g., quality of service) specifications 
mirrors time-critical information delivery systems such as a newspaper or magazine; 
hence the reference to publish-subscribe.   
                                                 
9 Data-centric communications decouples senders from receivers; the less coupled the publishers and 
the subscribers are, the easier it becomes to extend the network in terms of scalability and flexibility [64]. 
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However, not all subscribers in a large distributed system are interested in every 
event that is being published within the system.  For example, network defense specialists 
may be monitoring for specific event alarms or thresholds which might be considered 
precursor events to a network attack.  For this reason, various implementations of the 
publish-subscribe scheme have been developed; topic-based, content-based, and type-
based [62], [63]. 
a. Topic-based Publish-Subscribe 
One of the earliest implementations of publish-subscribe, topic-based 
implementations, or broker-pattern, extended the concept of communication channels 
used to bundle communicating peers, with specific methods that characterize and classify 
event content.  Topics, identified and typed by keywords are similar to notion of groups, 
or group communication.  Since the introduction of topic-based publish-subscribe broker 
patterns several improvements have been made such as the use of hierarchies to 
orchestrate topics [62]. 
b. Content-based Publish-Subscribe 
An improvement on the topic-based patterns described above, content-
based publish-subscribe patterns introduce a subscription scheme based on the actual 
content of the specific events versus an abstract topic, or keyword [62].  In other words, 
properties of the event such as internal data structure, security level or event type can 
make content-based broker patterns very flexible and powerful messaging construct, 
particularly when coupled together forming customized subscription schemes. 
c. Type-based Publish-Subscribe 
An extension of topic-based publish-subscribe, type-based focuses on 
specific data type as a way to identify the kind of data to which the user is subscribing 
[62].  This strategy provides a tighter coupling and integration of the language and 
middleware increasing system efficiency by reducing the computational overhead 
associated with topic-based and content-based messaging analysis.   
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4. Publish-Subscribe for Cyberspace Defense 
Some key features that give publish-subscribe middleware an advantage in 
network security and cyberspace defense are: 
-  Publish-subscribe systems are well suited to distribute large quantities of 
information with minimal delay, even in the presence of unreliable or bandwidth 
constrained environments such as satellite links, or shared tactical links. 
-  Finding the correct information is trivial since subscriber nodes simply declare 
their interest in a topic and the system delivers it as soon as it becomes available.  
Similarly, sending the right data is trivial since the system publishes information as soon 
as it becomes available to the system. 
-  Publish-subscribe is efficient from a system resource standpoint since messages 
flow directly from source to consumer of the information without the need for 
intermediate servers, storage or message processing.  Multiple nodes can subscribe to, 
and publish, the same information, introducing redundancy and fault tolerance into the 
system. 
Publish-subscribe technology has already been incorporated into industrial design 
systems, stock exchanges and in some cases military weapon systems.  An important step 
in the future evolution and success of publish-subscribe however is that it has been 
recognized as a capability needing approved industry standards and a formal specification 
and oversight group. 
The Object Management Group (OMG), which maintains existing middleware 
standards such as Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) and Unified 
Markup Language (UML), has established the first international publish-subscribe 
standard, OMG Data Distribution Service (DDS).  DDS incorporates all the features of 
traditional publish-subscribe middleware and increases the QoS components available to 




5. Object Management Group’s Data Distribution Service for Real-Time 
Systems (DDS) 
In the OMG DDS model, information flows using a publisher and DataWriter on 
the sending side of the message, and a subscriber and DataReader on the receiving side 
(Figure 8) [64]. 
 
 
Figure 8 - OMG DDS Publish-Subscribe Model From [64] 
 
A Publisher is an object responsible for data distribution. It may publish data of 
different data types.  The DataWriter is the object the application must use to 
communicate to a publisher the existence and value of data-objects of a given type.  A 
publication is defined by the association of a data-writer to a publisher. This association 
expresses the intent of the application to publish the data described by the data-writer in 
the context provided by the publisher [64]. 
A Subscriber is an object responsible for receiving published data and making it 
available (according to the Subscriber’s QoS) to the receiving application. It may receive 
and dispatch data of different specified types. To access the received data, the application 
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must use a typed DataReader attached to the subscriber. Thus, a subscription is defined 
by the association of a data-reader with a subscriber [64]. 
Thus, DDS allows a flexible and discrete level of QoS control on either side of the 
communication path [64].  Additionally, DDS decouples communication at several levels 
adding flexibility and control to the system; in space (message nodes can be anywhere on 
the system – host, server, wireless), time (delivery of messages can be either immediate 
or at some other specified time interval), and flow (delivery can be made reliable under 
controlled bandwidth constraints.) 
The overall distributed application, as shown in Figure 9, is composed of 
processes called “participants”, each running in separate address space on different 
computers (client, server, wireless laptop for example.)  Participants can simultaneously 
publish and subscribe to typed data-streams identified by “topics”, which logically fit 
between specific publications and subscriptions.   
 
Figure 9 - Use of Topics in DDS Publisher-Subscribe Middleware From [65] 
 
Since publications must be known unambiguously such that subscriptions can 
explicitly reference them, “topics” are necessary to connect publishers and subscribers.  
To increase scalability, topics may contain multiple independent data channels identified 
by “keys” allowing message nodes to subscribe to many, possibly thousands, of similar 
data streams with a single subscription.  When the data arrives, the middleware sorts it by 
key and delivers it, with consideration to QoS parameters, for efficient processing. 
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6. DDS and Distributed Cyberspace Defense 
The following section lists several important aspects of the DDS specification that 
illustrate its utility in a distributed cyberspace environment and which should ultimately 
be considered as a foundation for the next generation cyberspace defense and cyberspace 
C2 applications [61]. 
a. Complex Data Flow 
Due to the implementation of QoS features, DDS is an excellent candidate 
for complex data flow environments.  These features allow the integration of non-
heterogeneous operating systems, hardware platforms and bandwidth constrained 
systems.  These features include the ability to fine-tune different message update rates, 
reliability factors or bandwidth control on a per-node or per-stream basis.  DDS QoS 
integrates various transport layers as well; from sporadic wireless connections to high-
performance switched fabrics addressing factors which typically impose uneven and 
unreliable delivery into systems [61]. 
b. Latency Requirements 
The DDS specification does not require a central server, therefore system 
implementation can leverage direct peer-to-peer, event-driven transfer.  This design 
provides the shortest possible delivery latency.  This also provides a significant 
advantage over traditional client-server designs as central servers and processors impose 
overhead and latency as an intermediate network hop that could potentially double 
latency time for round-trip processing.  In a large-scale real-time environment, central 
servers receiving and correlating data from many thousands of sensors can impose severe 
time delays overall.  Client-server designs, using and underlying TCP transport 
mechanism do not handle client-to-client communication efficiently due to the need for 
constant polling which also imposes performance constraints on the overall system.  DDS 
QoS standards allows applications to make important trade-offs which is especially 
critical in bandwidth constrained environments where timely delivery and receipt of 
information can mean the difference between life and death.  Many tactical, airborne and 
deployed networks fit this category where the tradeoff between reliability and low latency 
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is important.  In heavily networked or “netted” environments where many channels are 
available, DDS allows applications to leverage channel prioritization, ensuring even 
lower latency for high priority messages [61], [66], [67]. 
c. Large Networks 
Without the constraint of an underlying transport mechanism, or assuming 
the availability of reliability, DDS can take advantage of multicasting to send a single 
packet to any number of users that have expressed interest through subscription.  Multi-
casting with DDS has the added benefit of reducing message traffic, increasing overall 
throughput in the system [61]. 
d. High Data Rates 
DDS implements a direct peer-to-peer connection which is determined at 
subscription time.  When data is ready, every node already knows where to send the 
information, thus the actual sending process is more efficient than the typical TCP send 
(which requires discovery and acknowledgement) allowing DDS to publish repetitive 
data at very high rates.   Intrusion Detection System sensor data, for example, would be 
very repetitive status updates which would be aggregated at various points throughout the 
network [61]. 
e. No Single Point of Failure 
The DDS architecture specification does not require dedicated message 
handling nodes which allow the system to exist without single points of failure.  This is 
achieved because DDS routes using a peer-to-peer connection versus through a message 
server.  Thus, if a single node experiences a fault, the rest of the system is not affected—
redundancy of publishers and subscribers is built into the system.   Additionally, node 
failover can be configured on a per-data-stream basis giving the network transparent 
failover characteristics which is critical in a distributed command and control 
environment where dedicated backup systems must be employed to ensure survivability 
[61]. 
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f. Self-healing Communication and Dynamic Configuration 
DDS incorporates automatic discovery based on OMG’s publish-subscribe 
specification.  DDS allows the enterprise to be configured such that if network segments 
become isolated, they can continue to function with the resources available and when the 
network is reconnected, it will automatically rediscover the new nodes and function as an 
a whole entity.  In terms of cyberspace defense, this feature would be most beneficial 
when networks are added to the GIG or other subordinate level enterprise domains to 
ensure there are not gaps in the network security hierarchy.  The GIG is essentially a 
living entity, which responds to a highly dynamic global environment by constantly 
growing and changing.  The ability of a cyberspace defense system to successfully adapt 
to this environment without undergoing architecture revisions, reviews, or security 
analysis is critical [61]. 
Additionally, cyberspace defenders must rethink their approach to 
enterprise defense and thinking of their piece of the enterprise as the extent of their 
responsibility.  Rather, all of cyberspace must be considered in future implementations of 
enterprise cyberspace defense.  Distributed technology, such as DDS, that allow this 
unbounded consideration of cyberspace will be the key to this new generation of 
defensive systems.  Additionally, DoD cyberspace strategists must consider evolving 
methods of communication such as wireless and future cellular technology which 
effectively removes geography and location from the equation. 
g. Quality of Service 
The DDS specification includes over two-dozen individual QoS policies 
that can be applied to establish custom “contracts” between senders and receivers in the 
network.  Some of these key QoS polices that are relevant to the design of a cyberspace 
defense system are: 
-  Data lifetime, which includes data life while the publisher is 
active, or data life after the publisher is no longer available to the network.  This feature 
is critical to tactical environments where individual nodes that are publishing data might 
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be active for a very short timeframe but the data they publish needs to live beyond their 
presence on the net; 
- Frequency of information updates, i.e., the rate at which updated 
values are sent or received;  
- The maximum latency of data delivery, i.e., a bound on the 
acceptable interval between the time data is sent and the time it is received; 
- The priority of data delivery, tied directly to the transport 
medium  
- The reliability of data delivery and whether missed data will be 
retried.  This policy could be tied to data priority policy to ensure higher priority data is 
retried, while lower priority data is not conserving network resources, particularly in a 
constrained environment; 
- Duration of data validity; the specification of an expiration time 
for data to avoid delivering “stale” data which is vital in a time sensitive environment 
where messages must be synchronized with other entities to ensure operations are 
executed properly.  This policy is especially important in a command and control network 
function. 
These QoS policies are some of the features that, when coupled with type 
information (Figure 10), form the basis of the subscription matching mechanism of DDS 
and ultimately, whether publishers and subscribers can communicate [68]. 
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Figure 10 - DDS Subscription Matching with QoS and Type Information From [68] 
 
This extended form of data-centric design by “contract” helps ensure 
systems operate as intended by its designers, both from a functional and QoS perspective.   
h. Discovery 
Another key design feature of DDS is that all information needed to 
establish communications can be discovered automatically, in a completely distributed 
manner.  Applications dynamically declare their intent to become publishers and/or 
subscribers of one or more topics to the DDS middleware, which then uses this 
information to establish the proper communication paths between discovered entities 
[68]. 
At present, DDS is employed by two major vendors that specialize in real-
time systems; Real-Time Innovations, Inc., and PrismTech, Inc.  Using the OMG open 
specification for publish-subscribe middleware as a foundation, each company has slight 
differences in their implementation. 
7. Real-Time Innovations DDS 
The RTI implementation of DDS is based on a decentralized DDS architecture as 
shown in Figure 11, placing the communication and configuration-related capabilities 
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into the same process as the application itself. These capabilities execute in separate 
threads (rather than in a separate process) and are used by the middleware to handle 
communication and QoS [69], [70]. 
 
Figure 11 - RTI DDS Decentralized Architecture From [69] 
 
The advantage of a decentralized architecture is that each application is self-
contained, without the need of a separate daemon. As a result, latency and jitter are 
reduced because fewer context switches are involved compared to the federated 
architecture, and there is one less configuration and failure point.  
The disadvantage, however, is that specific configuration details, such as 
multicast address, port number, reliability model, and parameters associated with 
different transports, must be defined at the application level. Requiring each application 
developer to handle these details is tedious, error-prone, and potentially non-portable. 
This architecture also makes it hard to buffer data sent between multiple DDS 
applications on a node, and thus does not provide the same entity-per-node scalability 
benefits offered by the federated architecture. 
8. OpenSplice DDS from PrismTech 
PrismTech Inc., uses the OpenSplice DDS which is implemented in a federated 
architecture, as shown in Figure 12.  OpenSplice uses a separate daemon process for each 
network interface which must be started before all entities in the domain can 
communicate. Once started, each daemon communicates with others and establishes data 
channels based on reliability requirements (e.g., reliable or best-effort) and transport 
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addresses (e.g., broadcast or multicast). Each channel handles communication and QoS 
for all the entities requiring its particular properties. Using a daemon process decouples 
the entities (which run in a separate user process) from configuration and 
communication-related details. For example, the daemon process can use a configuration 
file to store common system parameters shared by communication endpoints associated 
with a network interface, so that changing the configuration does not affect application 
code or processing [69]. 
 
 
Figure 12 - OpenSplice DDS Federated Architecture From [69] 
 
Another feature of OpenSplice DDS implementation is that it utilizes a shared-




Figure 13 - OpenSplice Shared Memory Data Space From [68] 
 
This memory architecture results in an extremely low footprint, excellent 
scalability and optimal performance when compared to other DDS implementations due 
to the fact that each reader/writer are “communication-endpoints” each with its own 
storage (i.e., historical data both at reader and writer) and where the data itself still has to 
be moved, even within the same platform, as is the case with RTI DDS. 
An advantage to using a federated architecture is that in general, it allows 
applications to scale to a larger number of DDS entities on the same node, e.g., by 
bundling messages that originate from collocated entities.  Additionally, using a separate 
daemon process to mediate access to the network can; 1) simplify application 
configuration of policies for a group of entities associated with the same network 
interface; and 2) provide a network scheduler that prioritizes messages from different 
communication channels.  
A disadvantage of the daemon-based approach, however, is that it introduces an 
extra configuration step—and possibly another point of failure. Moreover, applications 
must cross extra process boundaries to communicate, which can introduce overhead that 






This chapter has introduced and detailed a software architecture that is well suited 
for a cyberspace defense system known as real-time distributed middleware using the 
publish-subscribe specification.   
Under the context of integrated real-time software design solutions, a discussion 
of middleware was presented, outlining the three major categories of real-time designs:  
client-server, message passing and publish-subscribe.   
One of the most valuable features of publish-subscribe is that it incorporates over 
two-dozen QoS features that are customizable at either the sender or receiver node to 
ensure messages are handled appropriately [69].  Each of these QoS features, coupled 
with the DDS automatic discovery mechanism, is a critical design criterion for an 
enterprise network defense or cyberspace defense system. 
While the two commercial applications of DDS have their advantages and 
disadvantages depending on the specific system being developed, they were both 
developed using an open standard as the foundation.  The advantage of open standards is 
that any software system can be developed as a Government-owned solution which has 
tremendous security advantages over commercially developed software that is available 













IV. COVERT CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS 
The use of covert channels in a distributed real-time cyberspace defense system 
represents a new and radical departure from traditional network defense paradigms.  Our 
discussion of covert channels originates from the idea that information communicated 
between users of a networked system must be protected from adversary detection.   
The obvious question raised by this idea however becomes:  Why not just encrypt 
the communications between the users?  Recall from Chapter II however that data points 
to the sustained presence of adversaries inside the borders of our networks.  This poses a 
challenge even to encryption.  While encryption protects the information contained 
within the message, it does not hide the fact that there is a message to begin with.  As an 
example, Figure 14 shows a message exchange between two users, Alice and Bob.  On a 
typical network this message traffic would flow between Alice and Bob through some 
type of network appliance (i.e., router, switch, gateway, mail server, etc.)   
 
 
Figure 14 - Plaintext Message Exchange 
 
Also on the same network is a persistent adversary, Eve, who is passively 
listening to network traffic between Alice and Bob.  Since Alice and Bob are not 
encrypting their messages, it is trivial for Eve to intercept and extract their 
communication. 
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If Alice and Bob encrypt their messages however, as indicated in Figure 15, by 
the dashed lines, Eve is unable to extract the contents of the message traffic, but is still 
aware that Alice and Bob are communicating.  Collecting message transmission 
characteristics (frequency, duration, recipient, etc.) over periods of time, can convey 
useful information to an adversary.   
 
 
Figure 15 - Encrypted Message Exchange 
 
For example, if Eve was trying to passively footprint or enumerate the network, 
she could monitor network flow across the router or switch, while watching for an 
increase in traffic to or from the network’s security personnel.  Any change in the amount 
of messages might be an indicator that her position had been compromised and that she 
should leave the network or go into hiding.  Regardless, Eve did not have to know what 
was being transmitted; simply that something was being transmitted. 
In order to prevent Eve from acquiring any information about the network, and to 
protect the communications between important users on the network, something other 
than encryption should be employed.  Extending our previous example, we now introduce 
technology that renders the message exchange between Alice and Bob invisible.  That is, 
from Eve’s perspective, as a network traffic observer, there is no message exchange 
taking place, as shown in Figure 16.  To Alice and Bob however, messages flow as they 





Figure 16 - Covert Message Exchange 
 
As pointed out in earlier chapters, adversaries in cyberspace are already on the 
networks and are sophisticated enough to monitor critical communications between 
incident response teams and other critical command and control functions.  In many 
cases, these types of communications are more valuable than mining data from the 
network itself because they can reveal forensic and network defense tactics, techniques 
and procedures which should be protected to the maximum extent possible.  This is the 
utility and effectiveness of covert channel communications. 
A. COVERT CHANNELS DEFINED 
A covert channel is a mechanism that can be used to transfer information from 
one user of a system to another using means not intended for this purpose by system 
developers [72]. 
The term “covert channel” is typically associated with trusted computing due to 
the desire to prevent processes in a computer system from executing outside their 
intended purpose and violating some established security policy.  Trust, is an important 
characteristic in computer design. 
When a computer system is being certified for operation, particularly in a secure 
environment, or when the computer system is intended to process classified information, 
a covert channel analysis is required.  This rigorous process identifies portions of the 
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system that could be exploited and manipulated to provide the backdoors necessary to 
implement a covert channel.  In this context, “covert” has a negative connotation; covert 
is something nefarious and used for nefarious purposes and should be engineered out of 
the system. 
However, what if the system was designed to communicate with covert channels?  
What if the system could be designed such that covert channels were available and used 
when necessary to protect the existence of information on the system and kept from being 
exploited by an adversary?  Is there risk involved in creating covert channels for the 
express purpose of communicating, or does the fact that it is created make it not covert? 
We begin with some basic terms and references to define what a covert channel 
is, and what it is not.  Next, we present various methodologies of covert channel 
implementations and discuss how they are used.   
The first use of the term “covert channels” is attributed to Lampson’s “A Note on 
the Confinement Problem” which raised the issue of confining a program during 
execution so that it could not transmit information to any other program except its caller.  
The concern was with safeguarding data from unauthorized access or modification and 
that a trustworthy program must guard against any possible leakage of data [73]. 
From Lampson’s original classification scheme, covert channel analysis has 
evolved into two general categories;  
1)  Storage channels; in which data are written to a storage location by one 
process and then read by another process; and  
2)  Timing channels; in which the timing between transmitted packets is 
modulated at a specific rate thereby encoding information in the sequence variations 
Later analysis of communications processes [74] included both overt channels and 
covert channels.  Overt channels use the system’s protected data objects to transfer 
information.  That is, one subject writes into a data object and another subject reads from 
the object.  Channels, such as buffers, files and I/O devices, are overt because the entity 
used to hold the information is a data object; that is, it is an object that is normally 
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viewed as a data container [74].  Overt channels are controlled by enforcing the access 
control policy of the system being designed and implemented.   
Extending the term covert further and by using some of the semantics of overt 
channel communication, it is clear that “covert” can mean more than just an adversary 
attack/communication vector.  In fact, many covert channels are classified as benign, 
which carry the following characteristics [72]: 
 -  The sender and receiver is the same subject; for example in the ex-
filtration of data, an attacker would remove or copy information remotely, to themselves 
or to an intermediate host. 
 -  The sender is allowed to communicate directly with the receiver under 
the system’s security policy 
 -  There is no effective way to utilize the signaling mechanism 
In other words, covert channel communication implies that under the system’s 
security policy, the sender and receiver are not allowed to communicate; therefore there 
must be a mechanism which can be exploited which allows sender and receiver to 
communicate despite the policy constraints of the system. 
Clearly, there is confusion.  Even the word, “covert” has implications beyond the 
original connotation of Lampson’s use of the term.  The American Heritage Dictionary 
for example, simply states for the definition of “covert”:  concealed; hidden; secret [5]. 
Oblietely, et al [75], traced the evolution of the term “covert channel” through 
research and scientific journals to discover that indeed, there is no clear consensus as to 
what the fundamental definition should be.  Their analysis revealed no less than eight 
different definitions beginning with Lampson’s original usage of the phrase, “covert 
channel:” 
Definition 1:  Covert channels are those not intended for information transfer at 
all, such as a service program’s effect on the system load [73]. 
Extending the relationship of covert channel to the confinement problem first 
identified by Lampson, we then get; 
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Definition 2:  A covert channel is a communication channel that is based on 
transmission by storage into variables that describe resource states [76]. 
As the confinement problem context evolved into a differentiation between 
storage and timing categories, a newer definition emerged; 
Definition 3:  Covert channels are those channels that are the result of resource 
allocation policies and resource management implementation [77]. 
In the early 1980s, the DoD published its Trusted Computer System Evaluation 
Criteria which defined covert channels in a fairly traditional sense as: 
Definition 4:  A covert channel is any communication channel that can be 
exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner that violates the system’s 
security policy [78]. 
A newer, refined definition followed from McHugh, which attempted to integrate 
intent and motive into the definition with; 
Definition 5:  A covert channel is any mechanism that can be used to transfer 
information from one user to another using means not intended for this purpose by the 
system developers [72]. 
Closely following McHugh’s definition of intent, we saw the application of covert 
channel applied to network security environments, specifically firewalls with; 
Definition 6:  A covert channel is any mechanism that can be used to 
communicate between two parties through secured boundaries of data [79]. 
Another more generalized definition followed from Marone’s analysis; 
Definition 7:  A covert channel is simply the transfer of data between two 
processes that are not permitted or not known to be in touch with each other [80]. 
The IEEE collaborated and developed a definition which they qualified as, “a 
necessary but not sufficient” definition;  
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Definition 8:  A covert channel is a channel between a sender and receiver at 
different levels and there is a Trojan horse present that uses a communication medium 
other than a named object [81]. 
In an attempt to clear up the confusion, the authors of [75] chose to establish their 
own definition based on two factors; 1) that a definition of covert channel should 
encompass both storage and timing channels, and 2) there should be an association 
between the use of a channel and the violation of a security policy; 
Definition 9:  A covert channel is an unintentional communication path which 
results from a system’s resource allocation and management implementation and violates 
the system’s security policy [75]. 
Millen [82] and Morone [80] refined the definition to exclude the characteristics 
of information hiding, which occurs when the two communicating parties are allowed to 
talk; for example the use of steganography implies hiding information as opposed to 
covert channels even though the function of the steganographic medium is the same.  
Millen’s definition of covert channels states: 
Definition 10:  Covert channels are a means of communicating between two 
processes that are not permitted to communicate, but do so anyway, a few bits at a time, 
by affecting shared resources [82]. 
In Millen’s terminology, a channel’s distinction as covert is directly related to the 
security policy of the overall system:  If the policy allows the communication, but the 
communication is not observed, then the information is simply hidden.  However, if the 
security policy does not allow the communication, and the communication still takes 
place, then the channel employed is covert. 
Because there is no universally accepted definition of covert channel 
communication, further discussion of what is, or is not; covert yields little in terms of 
substantive academic progress.  Rather, we stipulate that covert recognizes the concept of 




or whether the communication channel is covertly violating the design of the security 
mechanisms built into the system [75], the end result should be the same:  protected 
communication. 
Specific characteristics of covert channels such as bandwidth10, channel 
capacity11 and noise12 factors associated with various channel implementations are 
beyond the scope of this thesis and should be considered in the system requirements and 
design phase.  For this reason, we continue the discussion of protecting communication 
by exploring specific network-based and distributed system covert channel 
implementations for the purpose of designing an efficient and effective communications 
mechanism that can be integrated into a cyberspace defense capability.    
B. NETWORK BASED COVERT CHANNEL IMPLEMENTATIONS 
The network based covert channels discussed below focus primarily on exploiting 
the data fields of network protocols that are used to communicate information, 
synchronization, etc.  Many of these standard fields are redundant or rarely used creating 
opportunities for numerous covert channel implementations.  However, the application of 
most network covert channel implementations remains limited due to the fact that while 
they take advantage of network protocols, they communicate information in a point-to-
point or one-to-one situation.  In other words, they do not scale beyond single user 
implementations and are thus inadequate in a distributed environment with a requirement 
for many thousands or even millions of hosts are communicating simultaneously. 
Additionally, many network protocols are not allowed through firewalls rendering 
network covert channel techniques ineffective in a wide area network, or cyberspace 
environment [83].  Protocol headers can be inspected for modifications or statistically 
                                                 
10 Covert channel bandwidth is defined by [75] as, “the rate in bits per time unit at which information 
is communicated.” 
11 Covert channel capacity is defined by [75] as “its maximum possible error-free information rate in 
bits per time unit.” 
12 Noise in a covert channel refers to the presence or absence of errors.  A noiseless covert channel is 
one in which the probability that the receiver receives exactly the message the sender sends is 1. [75] 
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significant data such as source or destination address that are outside the range of normal, 
indicating the presence of a covert channel. 
One aspect of covert channel communication that is especially important in a 
wide-area network system design is anonymity; where the communication between 
sender and receiver must be “unlinkable.”  In other words, communication between 
sender and receiver might be observed, but the observer cannot determine who is 
communicating with whom [83]. 
Extending this concept of unlinkable, communication is also said to be 
unobservable if the observer cannot determine if messages are being sent at all.  Thus, 
unlinkable and unobservable anonymity are the most desirable traits of a network covert 
channel designs which can also be applied in a distributed system.   
The following network-based covert channel techniques represent some of the 
more promising examples of this type of technology which should be considered for 
future research and integration into an objective full-spectrum cyberspace defense 
capability.   
1. Addressing Channel 
This type of channel, first reported in 1987, uses the destination address field in 
the IP header as a mechanism to transmit information.  The sender and receiver must first 
agree on a block of addresses which will be used in the channel construct, for example a 
block of 16 addresses.  The sender then sends any type of IP message to one of the 16 
addresses.  The receiver, in this case, a wiretap, or network observer, picks up the 
presence of a message to one of the 16 addresses, each of which represents a specific 
code.  After receiving network traffic based on a predetermined synchronization start 
time and duration, the receiver can then decode a message based on which addresses 
received a message and when. 
2. Data Block Length Channel 
Using the data block length, a sender can transmit a message by changing the 
length of the message for each IP packet.  A message of length 65, for example, would 
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correspond to the ASCII tables and indicate the letter “A”.  The sender simply sends 
messages with specific lengths which correspond to the predetermined code to the 
receiver who reads the length of each packet discerning the intended message.  One of the 
assumptions with this method is that the sender and receiver are allowed to exchange 
messages. 
3. IP Fragmentation Channel 
This method uses the Do Not Fragment (DF) bit in the IP packet to transmit 
information between sender and receiver.  The DF bit is used to prevent fragmentation of 
messages larger than the network’s Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU.)  If however, 
the sender and receiver intentionally send messages smaller than the MTU, the DF is 
ignored by the system and can be utilized as a binary communication mechanism; set to 
either a one or a zero.  This method can suffer data loss if the MTU is unknown which 
can be the case if the packets are traversing multiple networks and routers.  As with the 
Data Block Length channel, it is assumed the sender and receiver are allowed to 
communicate directly.   
4. Steganography in Networking using Toral Automorphism 
The combination of steganography applied to overt channel communications 
represents a possible solution to the dilemma of networking with covert channels.  While 
networks pose a particularly challenging aspect to covert channels due to the widespread 
employment of intrusion detection, firewalls, scanners, sniffers, traffic analysis, etc., 
steganography coupled with overt channel techniques have the greatest potential to keep 
communications unobserved. 
Ashan and Kundur [84] [85] proposed a solution to this problem by exploiting 
concepts from digital image watermarking known as toral automorphism systems.  Toral 
automorphism describes mathematical transformations using lattices to deform an image 
and produce a new image unrelated to the original.  This highly complex algorithm 
scrambles the original producing a high level of randomization.  These features of the 
toral automorphism systems make them useful in covert channel communications to 
ensure unlinkability and unobservability [83]. 
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In the first technique, Ashan suggests using toral automorphism to develop a 
look-up table, mapping each letter of the alphabet to an 8-bit binary value.  The selection 
of the 8-bit mapping is highly random and occupies the first half of the IP ID field.  The 
second 8-bits of the IP ID field are independent and randomly generated having no 
relation to the first 8-bit message portion [83], [84]. 
In the second technique, Ashan extends his use of toral automorphism to packet 
sorting.  His method takes advantage of the mathematical idea first raised by Shannon, 
[86], that given a set of n objects, a maximum of log2(n!) bits can be represented. Thus, 
for n=25, 83.7 bits can be communicated.  Using toral automorphism, the sender applies 
the resorting algorithm a specific number of times on the normal packet sequence to be 
transmitted.  This re-sequenced set of packets is then transmitted to the receiver, who 
reorders them based on previous knowledge of the keys used to order the packets in the 
first place [84]. 
5. Protocol Hopping Covert Channel 
Data hiding techniques in networks typically incorporate HTTPS, tunneling, 
IPSec or VPNs to protect sensitive information.  However, as previously discussed, the 
mere presence of these tunnels or VPNs indicates, to some degree, a certain level of 
information that can be valuable to an adversary.  Thus, one solution to utilizing 
traditional tunneling techniques is to employ more than one protocol to transmit a single 
message or information flow.  The Protocol Hopping Covert Channel Tool (PHCCT) [87] 
is an open source proof-of-concept solution that allows the user to define what types of 
protocols to use, and in what order they should be employed.  They can also be used 
using a randomized code to, as with a frequency hopping system [87]. 
C. COVERT CHANNELS IN DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 
1. ACK Channel 
This method applies in networked systems with built-in security that restricts 
message transmission between users of different security levels.  For example, a sender 
with a higher classification cannot send messages to a receiver of lower classification.  
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Rather, information must flow from low classification to high.  In this environment, 
exploiting the TCP protocols acknowledgement, ACK, message can be used to transmit 
information.  In this case, the sender has control of acknowledging messages from the 
receiver and can delay the ACK response based on predetermined time duration.  This 
delay indicates either a zero or a one bit.  The receiver measures this time delay and 
interprets the message accordingly. 
2. DBMS Channel 
In many distributed network environments, the only shared resources are database 
files that multiple users must interact with simultaneously.  Extending this to a multi-
level or secured environment, transactions are regarded as higher or lower depending on 
the nature of the client process initiating them.  In this case, the DBMS tracks whether 
users can read, write or both depending on the set security policy.   
For example, assume that the sender and receiver are allowed to read but only the 
receiver is allowed to write to a specific file.  The sender initiates a transaction which 
establishes a read lock on the file.  The receiver, accessing the same file then has to wait 
until the lock is released by the lock manager of the DBMS (as in 2-phase locking.)   
This mechanism can be employed on individual data items within a database to 
increase the number of “bits” with which to transmit information.  In other words, the 
sender reads or does not read data items that the receiver also has access to.  Each read 
lock transmits a “1” and the absence of a read lock transmits a “0” [88]. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Covert channel communications represent an opportunity to protect valuable 
information.  While this contradicts traditional definitions of covert channels, as outlined 
in Chapter II, the need to integrate some degree of covertness is critical and should be 
embraced by cyberspace system designers. 
This chapter introduced several techniques and technologies that should be 
investigated further for their potential integration into a cyberspace defense system 
providing realistic network defense capabilities using distributed system architecture.   
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In a networked environment, covert methods typically exploit the transport 
protocols which allow messages to flow between systems or even between networks.  
Addressing, data block length, IP fragmentation, etc., are all relatively simple examples 
that lay the foundation for further study.  More advanced techniques involve multiple 
technologies that, when integrated, establish even greater covertness, including 
steganography to create a covert channel riding on an overt communication medium as 
with Ashan’s toral automorphism technique.  Another open source tool under 
development is the protocol hopping covert channel software which is similar to 
frequency hopping techniques in traditional radio communications.   
Distributed communications represents a more complex environment to develop 
covert channels, however two potential methods could be incorporated; the ACK channel 
and the DBMS channel.  Both techniques take advantage of the shared resources that 
exist in a distributed network environment and also integrate a higher level of anonymity 
than with network covert channels, which is highly desirable in any covert system design. 
1. Further Reading on Covert Channels 
Additional covert channel techniques are discussed in [75], [83], [89], [90], and 
[91].  Methods of detecting covert channels and analysis of covert channel characteristics 
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V. CASE STUDY – CYBER OPERATIONS INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
In order to propose a solution to the requirement of creating an effective 
cyberspace defense capability an evaluation of network defense, real-time distributed and 
covert channel technology and strategies was performed.  While much research has been 
accomplished in each area, there has been no work, to date, where all three have been 
brought together as a single integrated solution. 
One solution was identified that brought two areas together; network defense and 
real-time distributed systems technology.  This chapter evaluates the main features of this 
system and proposes a strategy to integrate the third feature, covert channel 
communications. 
A. COIS BACKGROUND 
Recognizing the need for an improved network defense capability, U.S. Space 
Command, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Advanced Research Project 
Agency/Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Program Office sponsored an 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration project called Active Network Intrusion 
Defense (ANID) in 2001.  The goal of ANID was to demonstrate a capability to respond 
in real time to network intrusions by making changes to network devices like routers, 
firewalls, intrusion sensors, etc.  The ANID system incorporated features such as a highly 
distributed architecture with intrusion detection capabilities installed at very low levels, 
and a collection of smart agents to correlate sensor information and distribute summary 
level alert information to neighboring nodes. 
Following the successful demonstration of ANID, the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) evolved the technology into a full-spectrum cyber warfare command and control 
(C2) and battle management (BM) system called the Cyber Operations and Information-
warfare System (COIS.)  The first application of the COIS technology was deployed with 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) through a joint research 
endeavor between several government organizations. 
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The COIS application is a cyber defense system that provides cyber warfare 
situational awareness while supporting collaboration among members of the various 
operational communities known as Information Assurance (IA) Operation Centers 
(IAOC).  The IAOC construct was initially conceived and developed through a 
collaborative effort between the Missile Defense Agency and the Institute for Defense 
Analysis and ultimately became the cornerstone of the COIS capability [95].  The IAOC 
also enables COIS to provide a virtual collaborative environment among members within 
an organization or functional community, among members of similar organizations or 
functional communities, or even among members of dissimilar or geographically 
dispersed organizations or communities [96]. 
COIS enables the collaboration of experts in various fields, at different NASA 
locations, with different sets of roles and responsibilities, through the creation and 
operation of virtual communities.  COIS provides cyber warfare situational awareness, 
including a real-time common operating picture of the status of NASA networks and any 
ongoing attacks or cyber operations.  It also provides a unification of all personnel 
performing IA; the IAOC. This team has access to a broad base of information sources 
within COIS which allows them to collaborate, use tools, conduct research, and act in 
concert across organizational and role related lines [96]. 
Frequent users of COIS access the system by clicking an icon on their main 
window and logging in. Experts in various cyber warfare disciplines, invited to 
participate in cyber operations during exercises or in other special situations, gain 
controlled access to specific relevant information presented by a limited part of the 
system through a secure channel.  
1. Purpose of the System 
COIS prototyping began after a thorough analysis of the current state of network 
defense systems proved that current technology was inadequate and would become 
increasingly inadequate as networks and information technology became more complex, 
more interconnected and that fewer technical personnel would be involved in the 
management and leadership of network defense and cyberspace operations.  NASA 
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identified four key areas that highlighted the cyberspace defense problem that led to the 
original COIS requirement:  strategy, awareness, knowledge and organizational 
problems.   
a. Cyber Defense Strategy Problems 
-  Current network defense strategy is unrealistically narrow and primarily 
focuses on keeping attackers out of the network.  New strategies must consider how to 
remove threats once they are discovered and how to mitigate the damage to an enterprise 
that is global in scope 
-  Current strategy fails to recognize the fundamental concepts of cyber 
warfare.  Recognizing that cyberspace is in fact, a warfighting domain has recently taken 
hold within the Air Force however this recognition is new and must be developed rapidly 
to effectively counter the growing threat.  NASA suggests several new approaches:  
maneuver (keeping assets in motion to avoid detection or from being destroyed), hunt-
and-kill techniques employing mobile agents to autonomously “guard” borders and patrol 
internal networks, and developing more effective methods to attack and destroy hidden 
enemy assets (e.g., rootkit hunters.)  
b. Cyber Defense Awareness Problems 
-  We don’t know when intruders enter our networks 
-  We don’t know our current network configurations 
 -- Scans are not managed and done routinely 
 -- We do not know all of our network device configurations 
 -- We don’t know if the configurations we do know are correct and 
effective 
-  We do not know the integrity of our enterprise systems 
-  We do not know the integrity of our data 
-  We do not know our cyberspace situational awareness 
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 -- What is our Cyber Order of Battle? 
 -- What is our current attack situation (red and blue)? 
 -- What courses of action are available at any given time for a 
specific attack scenario? 
 -- What are the standing rules-of-engagement should an attack 
occur?  
c. Cyber Defense Knowledge Problems 
-  We do not know how to design secure, real-time networks 
-  We do not know the software architecture of our current systems well 
enough to design effective network defense capabilities to protect them.  For example, 
are we using peer process architectures, client-server, middleware, etc.? 
-  We do not know if our system designs are correct.  Have they been 
designed to some standard?  If so, has configuration management been utilized to ensure 
modifications and upgrades also adhere to standards?  Can we demonstrate that our 
designs are correct?   
-  We do not truly know the extent of our current network defense 
appliance installations.  How many are in place, at what boundaries, at what 
organizations, how are they interconnected and managed?  What is their placement 
strategy to ensure proper placement and management? 
-   Our network security staff is inadequately trained to deal with the 
aforementioned issues as well as future threats to the enterprise. 
d. Cyber Defense Organizational Problems 
-  Traditional hierarchical C4ISR organizational structure is inappropriate 
for cyberspace defense and cyberspace operations 
 -- DoD must recognize that traditional methods for organizing for 
cannot adapt to the speed, number and dynamics of cyber attacks 
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 -- Traditional hierarchical organizational constructs do not permit 
commanders to be in multiple locations simultaneously (e.g., responding to a Distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack) 
 -- Traditional, organizational constructs that lend themselves to 
business process decision making do not promote rapid, time sensitive decision making 
and decision dissemination  
B. COIS OVERVIEW 
The developers of COIS recognized the need to link traditional network offense 
and defense technology with recent developments in computer technology in order to 
respond to the requirements defined by their initial capability gap analysis.  Traditional 
solutions such as IDS, perimeter sensors, firewalls and encryption were not meeting the 
expectation and complex demands of their analysis.  Non-traditional techniques such as 
virtual organizations, mobile agent technology, publish-subscribe middleware and 
collaborative messaging was necessary to close the requirements gap.  However, no 
single technology could provide the complete solution, so facets from each were 
integrated into a single full-spectrum cyber warfare command and control (C2) and battle 
management (BM) system. 
1. Virtual Cell Organizational Model 
COIS employs a unique structure to place cyber operators in the midst of their 
domain allowing them to combat threats regardless of the location.  Figure 17 illustrates 
this organizational cell construct and captures the differences between virtual cells and 
physical cells which would be tasked to support cyber operations across an enterprise.  
The virtual construct has several key advantages to a physical response organizational 
construct; mobility, rapid response, stealth and overcoming constraints of a high-demand 
low-density asset [96]. 
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Figure 17 - COIS Virtual Cells versus Physical Cells From [96] 
 
As the figure indicates, virtual cells are more flexible than physical cyber defense 
cells in that they can stand-up when needed or re-locate when and where needed 
regardless of logistical constraints such as travel time, personnel availability or other 
resource issues.  They also provide a more operationally relevant construct to manage, 
respond to, and mitigate adversary threats on the network.  Cells responsible for specific 
cyber operations such as Intrusion Detection (ID), Vulnerability Analysis (VA) or 
Incident Response (IR) can organize in a peer-to-peer fashion versus the traditional 
hierarchical that often constrains physical network defense organizations.  This ability to 
peer enhances collaboration and information sharing by providing direct message 
exchange between cells without the impediments of a vertically organized management 
system.  As the figure also indicates, the virtual cell can fall back into a traditional 
hierarchical organization when not in response mode, or for administrative reasons, 
preserving unity-of-command and centralized control, decentralized execution principles 
[96]. 
Additionally, virtual cells can be in multiple locations simultaneously; a powerful 
force multiplier considering the high-demand, low-density cyber operations personnel 
that are at the center of each cell organization.  As organizations within the DoD and 
across the Federal Government face increasing budget constraints, virtual cell constructs 
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provide a logical means to extend the reach of existing personnel across the enterprise 
saving the enormous costs of education, training and career management. 
One of the most powerful benefits of virtual cells is that they allow near real-time 
response to events regardless of the location in the organization or across the enterprise.  
In terms of time-sensitive responses, whether offensive or defensive, virtual organizations 
make the most sense within the domain of cyberspace where borders and boundaries are 
nonexistent and unaffected by the tyranny of distance. 
a. Virtual Cell Members 
COIS organizes the Information Assurance Operations Center (IOAC) 
virtual cell by breaking membership into one of three categories:  Core Members, 
Associate Members, and Consulting Members [96]. 
-  Core members, as the name implies, are full-time members of a specific 
community within the IOAC (ID, IR or VA for example) and perform the day-to-day 
tasks supporting cyber defense within the enterprise [96]. 
-  Associate members participate and share information but to not execute 
or make decisions that impact the network [96]. 
-  Consulting members are specialists brought into a community for a 
specific event or response action.  They have limited access to the COIS data and are not 
involved in the decision making process [96]. 
b. Core Communities 
NASA has identified seven core communities that ultimately comprise the 
IOAC virtual organization:  CIO, Cyber Warfare (CW), ID, IR, VA, Network Operations 
(NETOPS) and the Testbed communities.  Each community has full-time members that 
may or may not be collocated to meet the needs of their respective geographic or 
functional area of responsibility.  Associate and consulting members may join 
communities as necessary when seeking information or specific technical expertise [96]. 
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 -  Chief Information Officer (CIO):  Is responsible for direction of cyber 
warfare activities across the enterprise including assessments, vulnerability analysis, 
recovery operations, etc., [96]. 
 -  Cyber Warfare (CW):  These communities are assigned to regional 
HQ locations and coordinate with the CIO community for direction.  CW communities 
assess regional vulnerabilities, attacks and responses and perform day-to-day and long-
rang cyber planning in support of CIO requirements [96]. 
 -  Intrusion Detection (ID):  These communities detect activities such as 
adversary reconnaissance, attacks or intrusions in support of their CW community.  They 
are also responsible for network forensics of compromised systems in support of other 
community entities.  The ID community is responsible for day-to-day and long-range 
planning of how and what to monitor under their span of control [96]. 
 -  Intrusion Response (IR):  The IR community develops appropriate 
(pursuant to legal and proportional rules of engagement established by the CW 
community) responses to computer and network attacks.  They maintain a library of 
responses and design (in conjunction with the Testbed community) new response 
capabilities.  They are also responsible for damage assessment to adversaries as a 
consequence of attack through COIS [96]. 
 -  Vulnerability Assessment (VA):  The VA community is responsible 
for discovering potential vulnerabilities in networks under their span of control and 
reporting them to the CW community who determines mitigation strategies.  The VA 
community reviews policies, operating procedures as well as information flow in and 
throughout their assigned portion of the network for trigger events such as modem 
connections, password policy enforcement, software patch status, network scans, etc. The 
VA community monitors other VA inputs such as CERTS and JTF-GNO as well as open-
source organizations to maintain current status of network vulnerabilities [96]. 
 -  Network Operations (NETOPS):  The NETOPS community ensures 
availability of computer and network resources to accomplish the mission of their 
respective area of responsibility.  They take input from the ID and VA communities and 
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ensure identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities are fixed or mitigated.  The NETOPS 
community maintains DNS servers, e-mail servers, and perimeter assets such as firewalls, 
switches and routers.  They also ensure workstations within their span of control are 
configured, patched and maintained to standards [96]. 
 -  Testbed:  The Testbed community facilitates communication and 
collaboration among internal and contractor engineers and other organizations working 
with the IAOC.  In normal day-to-day operations mode, the Testbed performs operational 
testing and evaluation (OT&E) as well as research, development, test and evaluation 
(RDT&E) of current and future COIS technology integration.  During crisis actions, the 
Testbed resources can be used for contingency of operation (backup) and honeynet 
shunting to preserve and protect critical operational network resources [96]. 
 -  Dynamic Communities:  Under the COIS architecture, communities 
can come together to form new, transient organizations (Figure 18) in support of specific, 
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Figure 18 - COIS Dynamic Communities From [96] 
 
Following task closure or end of operations, the dynamic community is 
then decommissioned.  Under a virtual construct this process takes mere seconds as 
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opposed to reconstitution and other logistical concerns with a traditional network defense 
response or tiger-team.  Dynamic communities can be established by any of the 
community directors at or below their level (e.g., a CW director cannot establish a CIO-
level community, but can create a dynamic community with representatives from IA, ID 
or VA.) 
2. Architecture 
The COIS architecture takes advantage of several new technologies that allow the 
virtual organizational construct to exist and operate in a highly dynamic cyberspace 
environment.  The COIS application itself is based on publish-subscribe middleware 
written using the OpenSplice Data Distribution Service (DDS) specification.   
According to NASA, OpenSplice middleware provides the simplest architecture 
to implement a real-time distributed architecture and peer-to-peer collaborative 
messaging capability.   
The COIS architecture is two-level design (Figure 19) where command and 
control functionality is provided through the various displays and workflow management 
written into the COIS software [96]. 
 
 
Figure 19 - COIS Architecture From [96] 
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Second, the COIS infrastructure provides the underlying mechanism that 
implements the various features of the COIS system.  This infrastructure model is based 
on the publish-subscribe middleware but includes end-to-end security features, software 
agents and dynamic reconfiguration management to deliver a full-spectrum, flexible, and 
responsive C2 and BM cyber capability. 
Mobile agent technology provides another tool in the COIS arsenal allowing the 
virtual organization to respond to events regardless of their location.  The mobile agents 
are used for intrusion detection, intrusion response, vulnerability assessment and even 
collecting intelligence on adversary tactics for later exploitation.  Since they are not 
static, mobile IDS agent technology is difficult for an adversary to thwart and can be 
quickly and easily deployed to reinforce vulnerable locations in the enterprise.  This new 
concept of operation mimics traditional maneuver warfare tactics techniques and 
procedures drawing on other foundational Information Operations strategies such as 
military deception, psychological operations and operations security [97]. 
To illustrate the unified picture of COIS using various technologies; Figure 20 
shows the linkages possible between various units in the NASA organization.   
 
 
Figure 20 - COIS Strategic Operational Model with Mobile Agents From [96] 
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Direct lines of communication (shown as the link between HQs, CERTS and JTF-
GNO), virtual cells (shown as the ID, IR and VA cells), mobile agents (reflected by 
processes spawned from their respective cells and running inside traditional protected 
network defense assets) and publish-subscribe messaging technology (which provides the 
critical communication and rapid C2 dissemination capability) are all combined to 
provide a full-spectrum cyberspace operational construct; C2, Battle Management, 
Situational Awareness, Communication [96]. 
C. INTEGRATION OF COVERT CHANNELS 
As several of the figures illustrate, communication is an integral component in the 
COIS architecture.  Communication or electronic messaging is the tie between 
communities in the virtual organizations and is the key to their successful execution of 
CIO guidance throughout the continuum of cyber conflict.  Messaging flowing from 
publish-subscribe architecture also drives much of the mobile agent activities as well as 
the real-time collection and aggregation of time sensitive situational awareness 
information on the network.  Messaging becomes and even more critical aspect of the 
COIS architecture than with traditional physical cyber defense organizations due to the 
dependence on the virtual organization construct.   
For example, consider an organization with three geographically separated HQ 
elements, A, B, and C, each of which has an organic cyber defense capability consisting 
of an Intrusion Detection section, an Incident Response section and a Vulnerability 
Analysis section.  Each HQ element is responsible for the operations and management of 
their own provisioned portion of the overall enterprise.  An adversary is able to penetrate 
the HQ C network by exploiting a host through spear-phishing and implants a Trojan 
sniffing program to collect intelligence on as much as possible about the entire 
organization.  We will evaluate this scenario against two notional organizational 




Figure 21 - Traditional versus Virtual Vulnerabilities After [96] 
 
If our example organization employed a traditional cyber defense hierarchy, the 
adversary would be limited to the information they could collect.  In other words, it 
would be unlikely they could collect information on HQ A or HQ B as they are 
geographically separated and isolated on a different portion of the enterprise.  Rather, the 
adversary’s sniffer, passively collecting intelligence data, is only able to read traffic that 
is traversing the HQ C portion of the enterprise. 
If, on the other hand, the example organization employed a virtual cyber defense 
hierarchy which was interlinked with ID, IR or VA communities from other HQ 
elements, the potential to collect information on those other elements is much greater as 
the virtual organization provides a means to gain access to portions of the network simply 
by listening in on the traffic from the dynamic community that was created between 
various HQ elements.  They strength of the virtual organization thus, can become the 
vulnerability of the entire architecture. 
We therefore, propose a method by which messages exchanged between virtual 
organizations are transmitted through publish-subscribe middleware using a covert 
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channel protocol enabling communication without compromising the actions and intent 
of the cyber operators and ultimately, the organization. 
In Sections IV(B) and IV(C), several covert channel techniques were discussed 
that are potential candidates for inclusion into a system such as COIS.  The obvious 
advantage to developing this capability with systems like COIS, as opposed to other types 
of commercially available solutions, is that COIS utilizes open standard publish-
subscribe middleware.  The OMG published specification for DDS provides the 
framework to integrate unique messaging protocols to fit specific needs and requirements 
such as protected communication between virtual organizations.  While the 
implementation of covert channel communications in a real-time distributed system is not 
trivial, given the tools provided by the OMG specification, the task is not impossible.  
One impediment to such an approach is that with the exception of COIS, data-centric 
real-time distributed systems for cyber operations have not been looked at with any wide-
spread acceptance in the information technology business sector.  The majority of the 
network defense solutions available today fall within the network-centric client-server 
based architecture, but as Chapter II pointed out, traditional client-server network defense 
systems fall short of protecting, detecting and reacting to the complex environment of 
cyberspace. 
Another advantage is that while COIS was developed using off-the-shelf 
software, the program is government owned (i.e., the source code and executable files are 
under government control) which provides added protection of the code-base by limiting 
its availability to potential adversaries.  In contrast, the example cited in Chapter II, 
McAfee’s electronic Policy Orchestrator (ePO), was not developed to an open standard, 
but is commercially available, greatly increasing the availability to adversaries who wish 
to study the software for the nefarious purpose of developing exploits, which has already 






For it is an unfortunate fact that, while peace is our goal, we need greater 
military security to prevent war.   
John F. Kennedy [98] 
 
A. SUMMARY 
The war in cyberspace has already begun.  It takes place every day, all across the 
globe and is fought with speed and anonymity that kinetic warfighters are struggling to 
understand and defend.  War in cyberspace defines a new threat, one in which a single 
computer can be the asymmetric launch point for a massive invasion against the United 
States or our allies.  Therefore, it is incumbent upon the United States to defend against 
current adversaries, and prepare for even greater threats. 
An important aspect of preparation is understanding the nature of the environment 
in which war will be waged.  In other words, what is the nature of cyberspace?  Where 
does it begin?  Where does it end?  Who owns it?  If no one entity owns it, how is it 
divided such that its pieces can be adequately defended?  What does “ownership” in 
cyberspace really mean?  How do the laws of war and proportionality apply to 
cyberspace and cyber operations?  How does attribution and international law restrict or 
allow military actions in cyberspace?   
While these and many other questions regarding conflict in cyberspace are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, we must begin to address the larger problem by scoping 
the issue to our own provisioned portion of cyberspace; the DoD’s portion known as the 
Global Information Grid.   
Cyberspace, or network defense, transcends the roles between military and 
civilian.  The military is not a business, however, and our reasons for defending computer 
systems and networks are not the same as for many businesses and corporate network 
defense strategies.  Despite this fundamental difference, many technology strategists 
looked to the business industry as a model for developing network infrastructures, 
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enterprise governance models and even DoD network defense capabilities.  This was the 
so-called revolutionary strategic concept of network-centric warfare.   
Chapter II illustrated the dilemma this strategy has created for today’s cyberspace 
operations.  Network-centric concepts proliferated and have increased the complexity and 
configuration management of today’s digital battlespace.  Unfortunately, they have also 
made it increasingly difficult to realistically defend.  For the military, the task of 
defending our provisioned portion of cyberspace falls to the JTF-GNO, as sub-component 
of STRATCOM, which has the global mission to protect and defend the DoD Global 
Information Grid.  Their latest strategy to protect and defend cyberspace relies on the 
Host Based Security System (HBSS); a commercial product that distributes servers 
throughout the infrastructure which communicate to hosts throughout the DoD.  The suite 
of tools includes patching, desktop configuration and a personal firewall to protect 
individual computer systems.  The HBSS relies on a single-vendor strategy, which has 
already been compromised and exploited in the commercial sector.  It also relies on a 
hierarchical organizational structure to communicate information and control resources 
throughout the system.  Additionally, there is no C2 function or incident response 
capability embedded in HBSS.   
While client-server architectures, such as HBSS, are well suited for traditional 
enterprise computing environments, they do not scale or adapt to tactical and other 
bandwidth constrained environments, which must also be protected and defended.  
Additionally, military networks are constantly changing as tactical, operational and 
strategic threats change.  The ability to rapidly adapt to the dynamic environment of 
cyberspace is a critical requirement to defending cyberspace whether it is a mobile 
wireless tactical network feeding time critical data to a battlefield command post, or 
adding a large bandwidth weather feed to a base infrastructure in the U.S.  Each must be 
protected and defended as the cyberspace topology changes.   
Real-time distributed systems represent technology well suited to provide this 
type of capability.  It is designed to process and share information between 
geographically dispersed entities through a well organized and structured message 
sharing process (e.g., the internet.)  As the term also implies, real-time information is 
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processed as it is produced and/or received within the system.  While there are different 
types of distributed system messaging schemes, arguably, the publish-subscribe method 
has the most relevance in terms of building a cyberspace defense capability.   
Chapter III details the architecture of publish-subscribe and discusses two of the 
major implementations that are currently available and are built upon an open standard; 
Real-Time Innovations Distributed Data Service (DDS) and PrismTech OpenSplice DDS.  
Current military real-time distributed applications focus on rapid message sharing and 
information processing; sometimes on the order of millions of messages per second to 
meet the demands of weapon system or telecommunications system design requirements.  
If a cyberspace adversary has infiltrated a system, these messages represent a major 
vulnerability both in terms of data that can be exfiltrated as well as intelligence that could 
be used to gain further insight into system design and operational capability. 
Real-time distributed systems incorporating the publish-subscribe architecture are 
an excellent starting point for an enterprise cyberspace defense capability.  However, 
military requirements for sensitive processing demand increased capability; protected 
publish-subscribe messaging.  In this context, protected communication goes beyond 
encrypted or secure methods of message exchange.   
Systems have been developed to encrypt information, which merely scrambles the 
data being transmitted such that the intended recipient can only decrypt it.  However, the 
fact that data is being transmitted at all can still reveal a great deal of information.  For 
example, an adversary who has compromised a system can passively watch network 
packet traffic flowing through the system.  If network traffic increases between system 
administrators and say, a network intrusion or forensics team, that might be a good 
indication that they have been alerted to the adversaries presence and they should move 
on to other networks or simply lay low until it is safe to resume their activities.  The cases 
presented in Chapter II clearly indicate that this is not a hypothetical situation.  
Cyberspace adversaries are developing methods to gather intelligence while on our 
systems, and have the ability to detect when our responses threaten their activities.  In 
order to counter this level of sophistication, the publish-subscribe protocol employed by 
an enterprise, distributed system must employ covert-channel communications to 
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effectively hide the existence of specific types of message traffic.  By doing so, this 
protects the overall system and allows incident response and cyber C2 actions to occur 
without detection. 
The characteristics of covert channel communications imply that information is 
transmitted without detection either by using non-standard methods (e.g., storage 
channels or timing channels), or by using steganography to hide information in an overt 
communication channel.  Various techniques, discussed in Chapter IV could be leveraged 
and applied as a new broker-pattern protocol for the publish-subscribe middleware 
introduced in Chapter III. 
Finally, we presented a case study of the Cyber Operations and Information 
System (COIS) developed to provide a full-spectrum C2 and Battle Management 
cyberspace capability.  COIS is built upon the OMG DDS specification using OpenSplice 
as a framework for its publish-subscribe messaging capability.  The main feature of COIS 
is in the use of virtual organizations to meet the demands of cyberspace defense in a 
geographically dispersed enterprise.  By leveraging the capabilities of real-time 
distributed technology, NASA organizations can respond to an incident anywhere in their 
enterprise, tapping resources from specialists at any other location.  This unique approach 
ensures the high-demand low-density network defense specialists can be in multiple 
locations simultaneously. 
B. STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEXT GENERATION 
CYBERSPACE DEFENSE 
This thesis outlined key components of existing technology and network defense 
strategies that, when combined, form the basis for a next generation full-spectrum 
cyberspace defense capability.  Traditional network defense, real-time distributed 
systems and covert channel communications are the triad of foundational technologies 
that form this construct.  Figure 22 summarizes material presented in Chapters II, III, and 
IV highlighting specific characteristics that provide technological contributions to the 




Figure 22 - Full-Spectrum Cyberspace Defense Characteristics 
 
1. Traditional Network Defense Capabilities 
Leverage features of HBSS including Intrusion Detection, Intrusion Prevention, 
Vulnerability Analysis and Patch Management, Desktop Configuration Management.   
Include Intrusion Tolerance Systems as a GIG strategy.  A fundamental shift in 
how DoD approaches cyberspace defense must first recognize that intrusions are going to 
happen.  The truly relevant question is how should the DoD (and to a larger degree the 
U.S. Government) respond to attacks, isolate them, minimize the collateral damage 
caused by the attack and then recover from the attack as rapidly as possible?  A network 
defense strategy that focuses only on keeping the adversary of the network amounts to a 
digital Maginot line, which is as ineffective at keeping network intrusions from occurring 
as it was for keeping Germany out of France during World War II.   
2. Real-Time Distributed Systems 
Leverage features of the COIS cyber defense capability including its use of real-
time distributed system and publish-subscribe middleware, virtual organizational 
construct, and mobile agent technology as an offensive and defensive weapon.  Mobile 
agent technology should also be evaluated for use in configuration management and 
system baselining applications. 
 88
Distributed systems technology needs to enable a unified command and control 
process to ensure global scope and coverage while implementing and executing a 
centralized operational control structure. 
Migrate away from network-centric defense strategies towards data-centric or 
information-centric defense strategies.  This approach will allow cyberspace defense to 
focus on protecting the information traversing the network rather than protecting the 
network itself.     
3. Covert Channel Broker Pattern Technology 
Add covert channel communication technology to protect specific aspects of the 
cyber defense messaging.  Not every message in a cyber defense system needs the 
protection afforded by a covert handling mechanism.  Likely candidates for covert 
handling include C2 and Battle Management capabilities. 
C. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Cyberspace and Network Defense 
-  Research is needed into how to measure and mitigate social engineering attacks, 
which will continue to be an attack vector of choice for cyberspace adversaries.  Attack 
mitigation should not focus solely on technology however, but should also leverage user 
education as a primary means to thwart these types of intrusions. 
-  Development of new acquisition strategies that focus on data-centric solutions 
rather than network-centric solutions.   
-  Purchasing network defense solutions is a challenging endeavor.  Data-centric 
systems will cross numerous enterprise networks and will require considerable 
coordination and management to integrate and operate.  The DoD is currently not 
organized to acquire systems in this manner.  Rather, DoD funds, acquires and maintains 
systems for individual networks and enterprises.  The HBSS solution mandated by JTF-
GNO for example, is a single solution for DoD but is being purchased and operated by 
individual service components, extending the flawed network-centric model.  New 
funding methods must be developed that address this deficiency.   
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2. Real-Time Distributed Systems 
- Investigation into scaling distributed systems to include tens of millions of hosts 
across the federal government to address data-centric versus network-centric design 
limitations 
- Publish-Subscribe broker pattern designs to facilitate integration and 
implementation across multi-level secure distributed systems.   
3. Covert Channels and Information Protection 
- Developing a suite of covert channel publish-subscribe protocols for 
implementation in an enterprise cyber defense capability 
-  Developing adaptive techniques to avoid active detection by an adversary 
-  Leverage work on protocol hopping as a covert communication mechanism [87] 
- Develop port hopping (a range of ports used to transmit messages) as an 
additional technique, possibly using port and protocol hopping simultaneously to 
decrease detectability (multiple protocols over multiple ports increases the randomization 
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